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Pentagon Analysts: MSM Ukraine War Coverage False: Russian Air War Limited in Scope

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“Polit­i­cal language…is designed to make lies sound truth­ful and mur­der respectable, and to give an appear­ance of solid­i­ty to pure wind.”

— George Orwell, 1946

EVERYTHING MR. EMORY HAS BEEN SAYING ABOUT THE UKRAINE WAR IS ENCAPSULATED IN THIS VIDEO FROM UKRAINE 24

COMMENT: A new piece by Bill Arkin in Newsweek presents infor­ma­tion from Pen­ta­gon sources—speaking on con­di­tion of anonymity—that con­tra­dicts the MSM/Azov Zelensky/Biden claim that Rus­sia is “indis­crim­i­nate­ly bomb­ing” civil­ians in Ukraine. That dynam­ic has been high­light­ed by the mas­sive explo­sions observed at a mall in Kyiv. A mall that Rus­sia claims was being used to store MLRS rock­et launch­ers. It’s a claim con­firmed by inde­pen­dent reporters, under­scor­ing how much of the fight­ing in Ukraine’s cities is tak­ing place because that’s where much of the mil­i­tary hard­ware is locat­ed.

The anony­mous Pen­ta­gon offi­cials Arkin spoke with said that Rus­sia has actu­al­ly been hold­ing back from engag­ing in the indis­crim­i­nate bomb­ing of civil­ian areas. Accord­ing to these offi­cials, we are see­ing a high­ly lim­it­ed urban bomb­ing cam­paign pri­mar­i­ly focused on mil­i­tary tar­gets.

It’s why most of the air­ports around Kyiv remain undam­aged and much of the basic infra­struc­ture of the coun­try con­tin­ues to oper­ate and much of the West of the coun­try has been large­ly untouched.

This “lim­it­ed engage­ment” is part of Russia’s strat­e­gy.

As these anony­mous Pen­ta­gon offi­cials also note, there is alto­geth­er dev­as­tat­ing dam­age to some urban areas, notably Mar­i­upol– pri­mar­i­ly been from ground fight­ing and the use of artillery. And, of course, we have to keep in mind that some of the high pro­file dam­age in places like Mar­i­upol, home of the Azov Bat­tal­ion, might be self-inflict­ed.

Our last post cov­ered this in detail.

For all of the talk we’re hear­ing about the Russ­ian mil­i­tary being forced to engage in medieval siege war­fare now that Ukraine has refused to col­lapse with­out a fight, the indis­crim­i­nate killing of civil­ians has not tak­en place.

So far, the Russ­ian assault appears to have been inten­tion­al­ly restrained for the vast major­i­ty of Ukraine. 

” . . . . ‘We need to under­stand Russia’s actu­al con­duct,’ says a retired Air Force offi­cer, a lawyer by train­ing who has been involved in approv­ing tar­gets for U.S. fights in Iraq and Afghanistan. The offi­cer cur­rent­ly works as an ana­lyst with a large mil­i­tary con­trac­tor advis­ing the Pen­ta­gon and was grant­ed anonymi­ty in order to speak can­did­ly. In the analyst’s view . . . the Russ­ian mil­i­tary has actu­al­ly been show­ing restraint in its long-range attacks. . . . As of the past week­end, in 24 days of con­flict, Rus­sia has flown some 1,400 strike sor­ties and deliv­ered almost 1,000 mis­siles (by con­trast, the Unit­ed States flew more sor­ties and deliv­ered more weapons in the first day of the 2003 Iraq war). . . .”

Key points of analy­sis and dis­cus­sion”

  • “ . . . . Russia’s con­duct in the bru­tal war tells a dif­fer­ent sto­ry than the wide­ly accept­ed view that Vladimir Putin is intent on demol­ish­ing Ukraine and inflict­ing max­i­mum civil­ian damage—and it reveals the Russ­ian leader’s strate­gic bal­anc­ing act. . . .”
  • “ . . . . Instead, his goal is to take enough ter­ri­to­ry on the ground to have some­thing to nego­ti­ate with, while putting the gov­ern­ment of Ukraine in a posi­tion where they have to nego­ti­ate. . . .”
  • “ . . . . ‘The destruc­tion is mas­sive,’ a senior ana­lyst work­ing at the Defense Intel­li­gence Agency (DIA) tells Newsweek, ‘espe­cial­ly when com­pared with what Euro­peans and Amer­i­cans are used to see­ing.’ . . . .”
  • “ . . . . But, the ana­lyst says, the dam­age asso­ci­at­ed with a con­test­ed ground war involv­ing peer oppo­nents shouldn’t blind peo­ple to what is real­ly hap­pen­ing. (The ana­lyst request­ed anonymi­ty in order to speak about clas­si­fied mat­ters.) ‘The heart of Kyiv has bare­ly been touched. And almost all of the long-range strikes have been aimed at mil­i­tary tar­gets.’ . . . .”
  • “ . . . . In the cap­i­tal, most observ­able to the west, Kyiv city author­i­ties say that some 55 build­ings have been dam­aged and that 222 peo­ple have died since Feb­ru­ary 24. It is a city of 2.8 mil­lion peo­ple. . . .”
  • “ . . . . ‘We need to under­stand Russia’s actu­al con­duct,’ says a retired Air Force offi­cer, a lawyer by train­ing who has been involved in approv­ing tar­gets for U.S. fights in Iraq and Afghanistan. The offi­cer cur­rent­ly works as an ana­lyst with a large mil­i­tary con­trac­tor advis­ing the Pen­ta­gon and was grant­ed anonymi­ty in order to speak can­did­ly. . . .
  • “ . . . . ‘If we mere­ly con­vince our­selves that Rus­sia is bomb­ing indis­crim­i­nate­ly, or [that] it is fail­ing to inflict more harm because its per­son­nel are not up to the task or because it is tech­ni­cal­ly inept, then we are not see­ing the real con­flict.’ In the analyst’s view, though the war has led to unprece­dent­ed destruc­tion in the south and east, the Russ­ian mil­i­tary has actu­al­ly been show­ing restraint in its long-range attacks. . . .”
  • “ . . . . As of the past week­end, in 24 days of con­flict, Rus­sia has flown some 1,400 strike sor­ties and deliv­ered almost 1,000 mis­siles (by con­trast, the Unit­ed States flew more sor­ties and deliv­ered more weapons in the first day of the 2003 Iraq war). The vast major­i­ty of the airstrikes are over the bat­tle­field, with Russ­ian air­craft pro­vid­ing ‘close air sup­port’ to ground forces. The remainder—less than 20 per­cent, accord­ing to U.S. experts—has been aimed at mil­i­tary air­fields, bar­racks and sup­port­ing depots. . . .”
  • “. . . . ‘I know it’s hard … to swal­low that the car­nage and destruc­tion could be much worse than it is,’ says the DIA ana­lyst. ‘But that’s what the facts show. This sug­gests to me, at least, that Putin is not inten­tion­al­ly attack­ing civil­ians, that per­haps he is mind­ful that he needs to lim­it dam­age in order to leave an out for nego­ti­a­tions.’ . . . .
  • “ . . . . Rus­sia began its inva­sion of Ukraine on Feb­ru­ary 24 with an air and mis­sile attack tar­get­ed against some 65 air­fields and mil­i­tary instal­la­tions. On the first night, at least 11 air­fields were attacked. Some 50 addi­tion­al mil­i­tary instal­la­tions and air defense sites were hit, includ­ing 18 ear­ly-warn­ing radar facil­i­ties. . . .”
  • “ . . . . In these ini­tial salvos, a total of some 240 weapons were expend­ed, includ­ing 166 air‑, ground‑, and sea-based mis­siles. Though there were a good num­ber of longer-range bombers (fly­ing from Russ­ian soil), most of the airstrikes were short­er-range and most of the mis­siles launched were also short-range types of the Iskan­der (NATO SS-26 Stone) and Tochka (NATO SS-21 Scarab) class­es. . . .”
  • “ . . . . The breadth of the attack—north to south, east to west—led many observers to com­pare the open­ing bom­bard­ment to a pat­tern seen in U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, where large salvos con­cen­trat­ing on air defens­es and air­fields had the intent of estab­lish­ing air supe­ri­or­i­ty, a shock strike that would then open the skies for fol­low-on bomb­ing at will.When it came to Ukraine, not only did many observers ‘mir­ror-image’ Russ­ian objec­tives to match U.S. prac­tices, they also made pre­ma­ture (and incor­rect) obser­va­tions that Rus­sia was fight­ing such a con­flict. . . .”
  • “ . . . . Even before Russ­ian ground forces reached Kyiv and oth­er cities, this nar­ra­tive goes, the air and mis­sile forces would have so dam­aged Ukraine—including its com­mu­ni­ca­tions and oth­er infra­struc­ture need­ed for defens­es to con­tin­ue working—that it would secure vic­to­ry on the ground. . . .”
  • “ . . . . Rus­sia has not achieved any of these goals. Though the out­lines of its first night of strikes sug­gest­ed an air supe­ri­or­i­ty cam­paign and an intense and focused destruc­tion of Ukraine’s mil­i­tary, after a month of war, con­tin­ued tar­get­ing tells a dif­fer­ent sto­ry. Rus­sia still hasn’t com­plete­ly knocked out the Ukrain­ian air force, nor has it estab­lished air supe­ri­or­i­ty. Air­fields away from the bat­tle­field are most­ly still oper­a­ble and some (in major cities) haven’t been bombed at all. The fab­ric of com­mu­ni­ca­tions in the coun­try con­tin­ues to oper­ate intact. There has been no method­i­cal Russ­ian attack on trans­porta­tion routes or bridges to impede Ukrain­ian ground defens­es or sup­plies. Though elec­tri­cal pow­er plants have been hit, they are all in con­test­ed ter­ri­to­ry or near mil­i­tary instal­la­tions and deploy­ments. None have been inten­tion­al­ly tar­get­ed. . . .”
  • “ . . . . In fact, there has been no method­i­cal bomb­ing cam­paign to achieve any sys­temic out­come of a strate­gic nature. Air and mis­sile strikes, which ini­tial­ly seemed to tell one sto­ry, have almost exclu­sive­ly been in direct sup­port of ground forces. . . .”
  • “ . . . . Rus­sia did not bomb sta­tion­ary air defense emplace­ments pro­tect­ing cities. U.S. ana­lysts say Putin’s gen­er­als were par­tic­u­lar­ly reluc­tant to attack urban tar­gets in Kyiv. As a result, regard­less of the Kremlin’s plans—whether Rus­sia was actu­al­ly seek­ing air supe­ri­or­i­ty or intend­ed to lim­it dam­age in Kyiv—there is no ques­tion that Putin has had to revise the long-range attack plan. . . .”
  • “ . . . . Over the course of almost four weeks, mis­siles fired at Kyiv have been scarce.Ukrain­ian media have report­ed just more than a dozen inci­dents involv­ing Russ­ian cruise and bal­lis­tic mis­siles inter­cept­ed over the city and its clos­est sub­urbs since Feb­ru­ary 24. And all of them, U.S. experts say, have been clear­ly head­ed for legit­i­mate mil­i­tary tar­gets. . . .”
  • “ . . . . ‘The fact that the mobile S‑300 SAM sys­tems are still oper­at­ing is a pow­er­ful indict­ment of Russia’s abil­i­ty to con­duct dynam­ic or time-sen­si­tive tar­get­ing,’ the Atlantic Coun­cil assert­ed this week in a mil­i­tary brief. . . .”
  • “ . . . . The DIA ana­lyst dis­agrees: ‘For what­ev­er rea­son, clear­ly the Rus­sians have been reluc­tant to strike inside the urban mega­lopo­lis of Kyiv. . . .
  • “ . . . . ‘Yes they might not be up to the U.S. task [in dynam­ic tar­get­ing] or in estab­lish­ing air supe­ri­or­i­ty … But this is the Russ­ian air force, sub­or­di­nate to the ground forces. And this war is dif­fer­ent: it’s being fought on the ground, where every­thing strate­gic that Rus­sia might destroy in front of its forces—bridges, com­mu­ni­ca­tions, air­fields, etc.—also becomes unus­able to them as they move for­ward.’ . . . .”
  • “ . . . . From the very begin­ning of air strikes, both U.S. ana­lysts agree, some of the lim­it­ed air and mis­sile attacks have also had some inter­nal log­ic. Take, for instance, the air­field at Hos­tomel, north­west of Kyiv. It wasn’t direct­ly attacked because Rus­sia ini­tial­ly used it to land para­troop­ers, with the hope of advanc­ing to the cap­i­tal city. Instead the air­field and the sur­round­ing coun­try­side became the scene a major bat­tle, as Ukrain­ian forces mount­ed a fierce defense. . . .”
  • “ . . . . In the south, Kher­son air­port also wasn’t attacked. The rea­son has become clear: Rus­sia is now using that very air­field to stage its own forces. . . .”
  • “ . . . . In Kyiv, only one of the major air­ports was struck, in Boryspil. The news media report­ed that the ‘inter­na­tion­al air­port’ was hit, but the dual civ­il-mil­i­tary air­field is also home to Ukraine Air Force’s 15th Trans­port Wing, includ­ing the pres­i­den­tial Tu-134 jet that might have been used by Ukrain­ian Pres­i­dent Zelen­sky if he chose to evac­u­ate. The oth­er major civil­ian Kyiv air­port, Zhulyany, has nev­er been attacked. Nor have two civ­il air­ports in Kharkiv (Ukraine’s sec­ond largest city) been attacked. . . .”
  • “ . . . . The strikes inside major cities (Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odessa) have not only been lim­it­ed, but the retired U.S. Air Force offi­cer points out that even when long-range aviation—Russian Tu-95 ‘Bear’ bombers deliv­er­ing cruise and hyper­son­ic mis­siles —have flown strikes in west­ern Ukraine, away from the bat­tle­field, they have been direct­ed at mil­i­tary tar­gets. . . .”
  • “ . . . . And there has been strate­gic log­ic, at least in Russia’s view. ‘They’ve been sig­nal­ing,’ the retired offi­cer says. ‘West­ern air­fields [at Lut­sk, L’viv, and Ivano-Frankivsk] were hit because they were the most like­ly step­ping­stones for donat­ed fight­er air­craft com­ing in from Poland and east­ern Euro­pean coun­tries. When those tar­gets were prepped,’ he adds, ‘there was also talk of a west­ern no-fly zone where those [west­ern] air­fields might have been essen­tial. . . .”
  • “ . . . . ‘And the so-called peace­keep­er train­ing ground [in Yaro­viv] was hit because it was the place where the ‘inter­na­tion­al legion’ was to have trained,” the offi­cer says. ‘Moscow even announced that.’ . . .”
  • “ . . . . Rus­sia, the DIA ana­lyst adds, has also been care­ful not to cause esca­la­tion onto Beloruss­ian or Russ­ian ter­ri­to­ry, or to pro­voke NATO.Despite oper­at­ing from Belarus, Russ­ian ground and air oper­a­tions have most­ly been con­fined to the south­east­ern por­tion of the coun­try. And the attacks in west­ern Ukraine, have been care­ful to avoid NATO air­space. For exam­ple, the Ukrain­ian air­base at Lut­sk, home to the 204th Avi­a­tion Wing and just 70 miles south of the Belarus, was attacked March 13th by long-range bombers. The mis­siles were launched from the south, from over the Black Sea. . . .”
  • “ . . . . ‘Peo­ple are talk­ing about Grozny [in Chech­nya] and Alep­po [in Syr­ia], and the raz­ing of Ukrain­ian cities’ a sec­ond retired U.S. Air Force senior offi­cer tells Newsweek. ‘But even in the case of south­ern cities, where artillery and rock­ets are with­in range of pop­u­lat­ed cen­ters, the strikes seem to be try­ing to tar­get Ukrain­ian mil­i­tary units, many of which by neces­si­ty oper­at­ing from inside urban areas.’ . . .”
  • “ . . . . He and the oth­er ana­lysts who spoke to Newsweekargue not only that the destruc­tion is only a small frac­tion of what is pos­si­ble, but also that they see a glim­mer of hope in a fact-based analy­sis of what Rus­sia has done. . . .”
  • “ . . . . The sec­ond senior offi­cer says that Putin obvi­ous­ly con­tin­ues to apply pres­sure against Kyiv, but Rus­sia hasn’t shift­ed much of its own forces and has con­tin­ued to back off bomb­ing in the city prop­er. ‘In that, maybe he is leav­ing room for a polit­i­cal set­tle­ment,’ the offi­cer says. . . .”
  • “ . . . . ‘I’m frus­trat­ed by the cur­rent narrative—that Rus­sia is inten­tion­al­ly tar­get­ing civil­ians, that it is demol­ish­ing cities, and that Putin doesn’t care. Such a dis­tort­ed view stands in the way of find­ing an end before true dis­as­ter hits or the war spreads to the rest of Europe,’ the sec­ond U.S. Air Force offi­cer says. . . .”
  • “ . . . . Heart­break­ing images make it easy for the news to focus on the war’s dam­age to build­ings and lives. But in pro­por­tion to the inten­si­ty of the fight­ing (or Russia’s capac­i­ty), things could indeed be much worse. ‘I know that the news keeps repeat­ing that Putin is tar­get­ing civil­ians, but there is no evi­dence that Rus­sia is inten­tion­al­ly doing so,’ says the DIA ana­lyst. ‘In fact, I’d say that Russ­ian could be killing thou­sands more civil­ians if it want­ed to.’ . . .”

“Putin’s Bombers Could Dev­as­tate Ukraine But He’s Hold­ing Back. Here’s Why” by William M. Arkin; Newsweek; 03/22/2022

As destruc­tive as the Ukraine war is, Rus­sia is caus­ing less dam­age and killing few­er civil­ians than it could, U.S. intel­li­gence experts say.

Russia’s con­duct in the bru­tal war tells a dif­fer­ent sto­ry than the wide­ly accept­ed view that Vladimir Putin is intent on demol­ish­ing Ukraine and inflict­ing max­i­mum civil­ian damage—and it reveals the Russ­ian leader’s strate­gic bal­anc­ing act. If Rus­sia were more inten­tion­al­ly destruc­tive, the clam­or­ing for U.S. and NATO inter­ven­tion would be loud­er. And if Rus­sia were all-in, Putin might find him­self with no way out. Instead, his goal is to take enough ter­ri­to­ry on the ground to have some­thing to nego­ti­ate with, while putting the gov­ern­ment of Ukraine in a posi­tion where they have to nego­ti­ate.

Under­stand­ing the think­ing behind Russia’s lim­it­ed attacks could help map a path towards peace, experts say.

In near­ly a month since Rus­sia invad­ed, dozens of Ukrain­ian cities and towns have fall­en, and the fight over the country’s largest cities con­tin­ues. Unit­ed Nations human rights spe­cial­ists say that some 900 civil­ians have died in the fight­ing (U.S. intel­li­gence puts that num­ber at least five times UN esti­mates). About 6.5 mil­lion Ukraini­ans have also become inter­nal­ly dis­placed (15 per­cent of the entire pop­u­la­tion), half of them leav­ing the coun­try to find safe­ty.

“The destruc­tion is mas­sive,” a senior ana­lyst work­ing at the Defense Intel­li­gence Agency (DIA) tells Newsweek, “espe­cial­ly when com­pared with what Euro­peans and Amer­i­cans are used to see­ing.”

But, the ana­lyst says, the dam­age asso­ci­at­ed with a con­test­ed ground war involv­ing peer oppo­nents shouldn’t blind peo­ple to what is real­ly hap­pen­ing. (The ana­lyst request­ed anonymi­ty in order to speak about clas­si­fied mat­ters.) “The heart of Kyiv has bare­ly been touched. And almost all of the long-range strikes have been aimed at mil­i­tary tar­gets.”

In the cap­i­tal, most observ­able to the west, Kyiv city author­i­ties say that some 55 build­ings have been dam­aged and that 222 peo­ple have died since Feb­ru­ary 24. It is a city of 2.8 mil­lion peo­ple.

“We need to under­stand Russia’s actu­al con­duct,” says a retired Air Force offi­cer, a lawyer by train­ing who has been involved in approv­ing tar­gets for U.S. fights in Iraq and Afghanistan. The offi­cer cur­rent­ly works as an ana­lyst with a large mil­i­tary con­trac­tor advis­ing the Pen­ta­gon and was grant­ed anonymi­ty in order to speak can­did­ly.

“If we mere­ly con­vince our­selves that Rus­sia is bomb­ing indis­crim­i­nate­ly, or [that] it is fail­ing to inflict more harm because its per­son­nel are not up to the task or because it is tech­ni­cal­ly inept, then we are not see­ing the real con­flict.”

In the analyst’s view, though the war has led to unprece­dent­ed destruc­tion in the south and east, the Russ­ian mil­i­tary has actu­al­ly been show­ing restraint in its long-range attacks.

As of the past week­end, in 24 days of con­flict, Rus­sia has flown some 1,400 strike sor­ties and deliv­ered almost 1,000 mis­siles (by con­trast, the Unit­ed States flew more sor­ties and deliv­ered more weapons in the first day of the 2003 Iraq war). The vast major­i­ty of the airstrikes are over the bat­tle­field, with Russ­ian air­craft pro­vid­ing “close air sup­port” to ground forces. The remainder—less than 20 per­cent, accord­ing to U.S. experts—has been aimed at mil­i­tary air­fields, bar­racks and sup­port­ing depots.

A pro­por­tion of those strikes have dam­aged and destroyed civil­ian struc­tures and killed and injured inno­cent civil­ians, but the lev­el of death and destruc­tion is low com­pared to Russia’s capac­i­ty.

“I know it’s hard … to swal­low that the car­nage and destruc­tion could be much worse than it is,” says the DIA ana­lyst. “But that’s what the facts show. This sug­gests to me, at least, that Putin is not inten­tion­al­ly attack­ing civil­ians, that per­haps he is mind­ful that he needs to lim­it dam­age in order to leave an out for nego­ti­a­tions.”

Rus­sia began its inva­sion of Ukraine on Feb­ru­ary 24 with an air and mis­sile attack tar­get­ed against some 65 air­fields and mil­i­tary instal­la­tions. On the first night, at least 11 air­fields were attacked. Some 50 addi­tion­al mil­i­tary instal­la­tions and air defense sites were hit, includ­ing 18 ear­ly-warn­ing radar facil­i­ties.

In these ini­tial salvos, a total of some 240 weapons were expend­ed, includ­ing 166 air‑, ground‑, and sea-based mis­siles. Though there were a good num­ber of longer-range bombers (fly­ing from Russ­ian soil), most of the airstrikes were short­er-range and most of the mis­siles launched were also short-range types of the Iskan­der (NATO SS-26 Stone) and Tochka (NATO SS-21 Scarab) class­es.

The breadth of the attack—north to south, east to west—led many observers to com­pare the open­ing bom­bard­ment to a pat­tern seen in U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, where large salvos con­cen­trat­ing on air defens­es and air­fields had the intent of estab­lish­ing air supe­ri­or­i­ty, a shock strike that would then open the skies for fol­low-on bomb­ing at will. When it came to Ukraine, not only did many observers “mir­ror-image” Russ­ian objec­tives to match U.S. prac­tices, they also made pre­ma­ture (and incor­rect) obser­va­tions that Rus­sia was fight­ing such a con­flict.

Even before Russ­ian ground forces reached Kyiv and oth­er cities, this nar­ra­tive goes, the air and mis­sile forces would have so dam­aged Ukraine—including its com­mu­ni­ca­tions and oth­er infra­struc­ture need­ed for defens­es to con­tin­ue working—that it would secure vic­to­ry on the ground.

Rus­sia has not achieved any of these goals. Though the out­lines of its first night of strikes sug­gest­ed an air supe­ri­or­i­ty cam­paign and an intense and focused destruc­tion of Ukraine’s mil­i­tary, after a month of war, con­tin­ued tar­get­ing tells a dif­fer­ent sto­ry. Rus­sia still hasn’t com­plete­ly knocked out the Ukrain­ian air force, nor has it estab­lished air supe­ri­or­i­ty. Air­fields away from the bat­tle­field are most­ly still oper­a­ble and some (in major cities) haven’t been bombed at all. The fab­ric of com­mu­ni­ca­tions in the coun­try con­tin­ues to oper­ate intact. There has been no method­i­cal Russ­ian attack on trans­porta­tion routes or bridges to impede Ukrain­ian ground defens­es or sup­plies. Though elec­tri­cal pow­er plants have been hit, they are all in con­test­ed ter­ri­to­ry or near mil­i­tary instal­la­tions and deploy­ments. None have been inten­tion­al­ly tar­get­ed.

In fact, there has been no method­i­cal bomb­ing cam­paign to achieve any sys­temic out­come of a strate­gic nature. Air and mis­sile strikes, which ini­tial­ly seemed to tell one sto­ry, have almost exclu­sive­ly been in direct sup­port of ground forces.

“Think of the Russ­ian Air force as fly­ing artillery,” says the retired senior U.S. Air Force offi­cer, who com­mu­ni­cat­ed with Newsweek via email. “It’s not an inde­pen­dent arm. It has under­tak­en no strate­gic air cam­paign as Amer­i­can observers might be used to from the last 30 years of Amer­i­can con­flict.”

Ukrain­ian air defens­es, both fixed and mobile mis­siles, have proven resilient and dead­ly.

“The Air Defense’s sur­viv­abil­i­ty and effi­ca­cy have sur­prised many, not only in Kyiv, but also across the coun­try,” Kyiv-based mil­i­tary expert Oleg Zhdanov told the Kyiv Inde­pen­dent.

Rus­sia did not bomb sta­tion­ary air defense emplace­ments pro­tect­ing cities. U.S. ana­lysts say Putin’s gen­er­als were par­tic­u­lar­ly reluc­tant to attack urban tar­gets in Kyiv.

As a result, regard­less of the Kremlin’s plans—whether Rus­sia was actu­al­ly seek­ing air supe­ri­or­i­ty or intend­ed to lim­it dam­age in Kyiv—there is no ques­tion that Putin has had to revise the long-range attack plan.

Over the course of almost four weeks, mis­siles fired at Kyiv have been scarce. Ukrain­ian media have report­ed just more than a dozen inci­dents involv­ing Russ­ian cruise and bal­lis­tic mis­siles inter­cept­ed over the city and its clos­est sub­urbs since Feb­ru­ary 24. And all of them, U.S. experts say, have been clear­ly head­ed for legit­i­mate mil­i­tary tar­gets.

“The fact that the mobile S‑300 SAM sys­tems are still oper­at­ing is a pow­er­ful indict­ment of Russia’s abil­i­ty to con­duct dynam­ic or time-sen­si­tive tar­get­ing,” the Atlantic Coun­cil assert­ed this week in a mil­i­tary brief.

The DIA ana­lyst dis­agrees: “For what­ev­er rea­son, clear­ly the Rus­sians have been reluc­tant to strike inside the urban mega­lopo­lis of Kyiv.

“Yes they might not be up to the U.S. task [in dynam­ic tar­get­ing] or in estab­lish­ing air supe­ri­or­i­ty … But this is the Russ­ian air force, sub­or­di­nate to the ground forces. And this war is dif­fer­ent: it’s being fought on the ground, where every­thing strate­gic that Rus­sia might destroy in front of its forces—bridges, com­mu­ni­ca­tions, air­fields, etc.—also becomes unus­able to them as they move for­ward.”

From the very begin­ning of air strikes, both U.S. ana­lysts agree, some of the lim­it­ed air and mis­sile attacks have also had some inter­nal log­ic. Take, for instance, the air­field at Hos­tomel, north­west of Kyiv. It wasn’t direct­ly attacked because Rus­sia ini­tial­ly used it to land para­troop­ers, with the hope of advanc­ing to the cap­i­tal city. Instead the air­field and the sur­round­ing coun­try­side became the scene a major bat­tle, as Ukrain­ian forces mount­ed a fierce defense.

In the south, Kher­son air­port also wasn’t attacked. The rea­son has become clear: Rus­sia is now using that very air­field to stage its own forces.

In Kyiv, only one of the major air­ports was struck, in Boryspil. The news media report­ed that the “inter­na­tion­al air­port” was hit, but the dual civ­il-mil­i­tary air­field is also home to Ukraine Air Force’s 15th Trans­port Wing, includ­ing the pres­i­den­tial Tu-134 jet that might have been used by Ukrain­ian Pres­i­dent Zelen­sky if he chose to evac­u­ate. The oth­er major civil­ian Kyiv air­port, Zhulyany, has nev­er been attacked. Nor have two civ­il air­ports in Kharkiv (Ukraine’s sec­ond largest city) been attacked.

Rus­sia start­ed the war with some 300 com­bat air­craft in Belarus and west­ern Rus­sia with­in range of Ukraine. Those and oth­er air­craft pulled into the war have been fly­ing about 80 strike sor­ties (indi­vid­ual flights) dai­ly. Ukraine claims that 95 of those Russ­ian air­craft have been lost, either shot down by air defend­ers or due to human error and tech­ni­cal prob­lems. (Rus­sia has moved addi­tion­al air­craft from oth­er bases to replen­ish most of its loss­es.)

The strikes inside major cities (Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odessa) have not only been lim­it­ed, but the retired U.S. Air Force offi­cer points out that even when long-range aviation—Russian Tu-95 “Bear” bombers deliv­er­ing cruise and hyper­son­ic mis­siles —have flown strikes in west­ern Ukraine, away from the bat­tle­field, they have been direct­ed at mil­i­tary tar­gets.

And there has been strate­gic log­ic, at least in Russia’s view.

“They’ve been sig­nal­ing,” the retired offi­cer says. “West­ern air­fields [at Lut­sk, L’viv, and Ivano-Frankivsk] were hit because they were the most like­ly step­ping­stones for donat­ed fight­er air­craft com­ing in from Poland and east­ern Euro­pean coun­tries. When those tar­gets were prepped,” he adds, “there was also talk of a west­ern no-fly zone where those [west­ern] air­fields might have been essen­tial.

“And the so-called peace­keep­er train­ing ground [in Yaro­viv] was hit because it was the place where the ‘inter­na­tion­al legion’ was to have trained,” the offi­cer says. “Moscow even announced that.”

Rus­sia, the DIA ana­lyst adds, has also been care­ful not to cause esca­la­tion onto Beloruss­ian or Russ­ian ter­ri­to­ry, or to pro­voke NATO. Despite oper­at­ing from Belarus, Russ­ian ground and air oper­a­tions have most­ly been con­fined to the south­east­ern por­tion of the coun­try. And the attacks in west­ern Ukraine, have been care­ful to avoid NATO air­space. For exam­ple, the Ukrain­ian air­base at Lut­sk, home to the 204th Avi­a­tion Wing and just 70 miles south of the Belarus, was attacked March 13th by long-range bombers. The mis­siles were launched from the south, from over the Black Sea. . . .

. . . . Evi­dence on the bat­tle­field, where there has been grind­ing fight for territory—in Kharkiv, in the con­test­ed front line towns like Mar­i­upol, Miko­lai­iv, and Sumy in the east; and Cherni­hiv north­east of Kyiv—indicates that civil­ian deaths have been much high­er where ground forces are oper­at­ing.

Even though the major­i­ty of Russ­ian airstrikes have tak­en place in these areas, the increased civil­ian harm is due to the use of artillery and mul­ti­ple rock­et launch­ers, not Russ­ian air or long-range mis­sile strikes.

“Peo­ple are talk­ing about Grozny [in Chech­nya] and Alep­po [in Syr­ia], and the raz­ing of Ukrain­ian cities” a sec­ond retired U.S. Air Force senior offi­cer tells Newsweek. “But even in the case of south­ern cities, where artillery and rock­ets are with­in range of pop­u­lat­ed cen­ters, the strikes seem to be try­ing to tar­get Ukrain­ian mil­i­tary units, many of which by neces­si­ty oper­at­ing from inside urban areas.”

The offi­cer request­ed anonymi­ty because he is being pri­vate­ly briefed on the war by the Pen­ta­gon and is not autho­rized to speak to the news media.

He and the oth­er ana­lysts who spoke to Newsweek argue not only that the destruc­tion is only a small frac­tion of what is pos­si­ble, but also that they see a glim­mer of hope in a fact-based analy­sis of what Rus­sia has done.

“I was ini­tial­ly puz­zled as to why more long-range mis­siles haven’t been sent into Kyiv and oth­er major cities such as Ode­sa, and also why long-range avi­a­tion hasn’t been used more in strate­gic attacks,” says the sec­ond senior offi­cer. “But then I had to shift to see the war through [Vladimir] Putin’s eyes.”

“Caught with his pants down, per­haps Putin indeed piv­ot­ed after he real­ized that Ukraine wasn’t going to be a cake­walk and that Kyiv wasn’t con­quer­able. Maybe he decid­ed to sole­ly focus on tak­ing ter­ri­to­ry along the periph­ery and link­ing up his con­sol­i­da­tions in the south, to be in a posi­tion to hold enough ter­ri­to­ry to extract con­ces­sions from Ukraine and the west—security guar­an­tees or some demil­i­ta­rized zone.”

The sec­ond senior offi­cer says that Putin obvi­ous­ly con­tin­ues to apply pres­sure against Kyiv, but Rus­sia hasn’t shift­ed much of its own forces and has con­tin­ued to back off bomb­ing in the city prop­er.

“In that, maybe he is leav­ing room for a polit­i­cal set­tle­ment,” the offi­cer says.

Sun­day, Volodymyr Zelen­sky told CNN he is pre­pared to talk to the Russ­ian pres­i­dent. “I’m ready for nego­ti­a­tions with him. I was ready for the last two years. And I think that with­out nego­ti­a­tions, we can­not end this war,” said Zelen­sky.

The fact that both sides are talk­ing, experts say, indi­cates not only how shocked they are by the destruc­tive­ness of a land war in Europe, but are also stymied in achiev­ing their mil­i­tary objec­tives. As Rus­sia advances, it is run­ning out of sup­plies. Its forces are also exhaust­ed. As Ukraine con­tin­ues its valiant defense, it too is reach­ing the lim­its of human endurance, fac­ing major loss­es and run­ning low on ammu­ni­tion.

It is now absolute­ly clear, all U.S. observers agree, that Putin and his gen­er­als over­es­ti­mat­ed their own mil­i­tary prowess while gross­ly under­es­ti­mat­ing Ukraine’s defens­es.

“I’m frus­trat­ed by the cur­rent narrative—that Rus­sia is inten­tion­al­ly tar­get­ing civil­ians, that it is demol­ish­ing cities, and that Putin doesn’t care. Such a dis­tort­ed view stands in the way of find­ing an end before true dis­as­ter hits or the war spreads to the rest of Europe,” the sec­ond U.S. Air Force offi­cer says.

Heart­break­ing images make it easy for the news to focus on the war’s dam­age to build­ings and lives. But in pro­por­tion to the inten­si­ty of the fight­ing (or Russia’s capac­i­ty), things could indeed be much worse.

“I know that the news keeps repeat­ing that Putin is tar­get­ing civil­ians, but there is no evi­dence that Rus­sia is inten­tion­al­ly doing so,” says the DIA ana­lyst. “In fact, I’d say that Russ­ian could be killing thou­sands more civil­ians if it want­ed to.”

“I’m no com-symp,” the ana­lyst says. “Rus­sia is dead wrong, and Putin needs to be pun­ished. But in terms of con­clud­ing the war in a way that both sides can accept and where we don’t see Armaged­don, the air and mis­sile war pro­vides pos­i­tive signs.”

Every war is unique and awful, and Ukraine is no dif­fer­ent. But Russia’s choice to mod­u­late its destruc­tive­ness is an impor­tant coun­ter­in­tu­itive ele­ment. Vladimir Putin can’t eas­i­ly win; he can’t accept loss or retreat; and he can’t esca­late. He has to keep destruc­tion and pres­sure at a very care­ful, just-bad-enough lev­el to keep some advan­tage.

“I know it’s thin con­so­la­tion that it could be a lot worse,” the DIA ana­lyst says, “but to under­stand how that is the case should real­ly change people’s per­spec­tives, even inside the U.S. gov­ern­ment, as to how to end this.”

Discussion

3 comments for “Pentagon Analysts: MSM Ukraine War Coverage False: Russian Air War Limited in Scope”

  1. It’s report card time! Let’s check in with how some for­eign and domes­tic fig­ures have han­dled this most Orwellian war. We’re going to start off with some of our slow­er stu­dents first.

    Michael Moore- Few fig­ures have had more atten­tion on the Left over the past three decades than Michael Moore. He is the essence of “you don’t get big”, in my opin­ion. I actu­al­ly liked his film Roger and Me and appre­ci­at­ed his Saudi/Bush focus in Fahren­heit 9/11 even if he didn’t go far enough. Bowl­ing for Columbine was an ahis­tor­i­cal joke of a film, how­ev­er, and com­plete­ly dis­tort­ed major events in Amer­i­can his­to­ry. Much of his oth­er work is also of sim­i­lar, bor­ing qual­i­ty. Let’s see how he did with his under­stand­ing of mat­ters Ukraine.

    https://www.michaelmoore.com/p/putintermsofsurrender?s=r

    “To: Pres­i­dent Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin  (Владимир Путин):
    From: Michael “Moorovich” Moore, Inter­im Nego­tia­tor for Ukraine (Іди на хуй сам)
    Sub­ject: Your Sur­ren­der
    Mr. Pres­i­dent:
    Now that your attempt to seize the nation of Ukraine is begin­ning to unrav­el — with your rich­est oli­garchs, Oleg and Mikhail, demand­ing an “end to blood­shed” and “peace now”; the always neu­tral Switzer­land now freez­ing your mon­ey, some­thing that they wouldn’t even do to Hitler; tens of thou­sands of young Rus­sians demon­strat­ing against your war all across Rus­sia; and the Russ­ian army now find­ing itself lost and bro­ken-down on the road to Kyiv (and dis­cov­er­ing why the Ukrain­ian Army is the sec­ond largest in Europe) — you must see the writ­ing on the wall. The entire world has aban­doned you, they won’t let Aeroflot fly over their coun­tries, they’ve cut you off finan­cial­ly and now you’ve just been boot­ed out of this year’s World Cup. 
    And the Asso­ci­at­ed Press has shown these pho­tos to the world of the dam­age your mis­siles did on Sun­day when fired into a Ukrain­ian mar­ket: You killed this lit­tle 6‑year old girl:
    (Includes pic of child in hos­pi­tal)

    OK, zip it, tub­by, we get your schtick.

    GRADE: F-

    Rachel Oswald- Lee Harvey’s baby girl has been tweet­ing a fair amount of anti-Rus­sia stuff. A lot of retweets of oth­er people’s non­sense, but one of her foci is cre­at­ing the notion that any con­cern over bio­labs or Nazis is QAnon stuff.

    https://twitter.com/OswaldRachel

    Sor­ry, Rachel, not easy being LHO’s daugh­ter, but no pity points in this class­room!

    
GRADE: F

    Bernie Sanders- To be fair, Bernie hasn’t been the worst on this issue and has asked good ques­tions about expand­ing the defense bud­get and oth­er mat­ters. This piece has him say­ing some good things. How­ev­er, at the root of it, when one denies that Putin had ANY rea­son for an inva­sion, one belongs to the Big Lie. Also, Putin has tried many times to solve this diplo­mat­i­cal­ly, to no avail.

    https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/bernie-sanders-ukraine/

    “Vladimir Putin’s lat­est inva­sion of Ukraine is an inde­fen­si­ble vio­la­tion of inter­na­tion­al law, regard­less of what­ev­er false pre­text he offers,” Sanders (I‑Vt.) said in a state­ment. “There has always been a diplo­mat­ic solu­tion to this sit­u­a­tion. Trag­i­cal­ly, Putin appears intent on reject­ing it.”

    GRADE: D+

    AOC: She is in a sim­i­lar cloud as Bernie, with no idea how to han­dle a cri­sis like this. She has also said some good things and thus avoids the F. How­ev­er, here we see­ing her push to get rid of Ukraine’s debt. Even on her twit­ter you will see some refresh­ing replies below from peo­ple say­ing “why are we for­giv­ing for­eign debts and screw­ing over our own peo­ple?” It was good to see.

    https://twitter.com/RepAOC/status/1508492301097926656?cxt=HHwWgIDUla3wnu8pAAAA

    As Ukraine fights against the Russ­ian inva­sion, we have a moral oblig­a­tion to assist any way we can. The Ukraine Com­pre­hen­sive Debt Pay­ment Relief Act would work to sup­port the imme­di­ate sus­pen­sion of Ukraine’s debt pay­ments, help coor­di­nate com­pre­hen­sive debt relief, and more.

    GRADE: D+

    Noam Chom­sky: How is everybody’s favorite mil­i­tary-fund­ed “left­ist intel­lec­tu­al” han­dling this issue? Eh, the usu­al mixed bag. Like Sanders, he is also push­ing the Big Lie. How­ev­er, much of this arti­cle has some inter­est­ing takes and he points out some of the bull­shit. I’m just high­light­ing the part where he com­pares this “war crime” to the inva­sion of Poland by Ger­many. That’s some big words there, bud­dy.

    https://truthout.org/articles/noam-chomsky-us-military-escalation-against-russia-would-have-no-victors/

    Noam Chom­sky: Before turn­ing to the ques­tion, we should set­tle a few facts that are uncon­testable. The most cru­cial one is that the Russ­ian inva­sion of Ukraine is a major war crime, rank­ing along­side the U.S. inva­sion of Iraq and the Hitler-Stal­in inva­sion of Poland in Sep­tem­ber 1939, to take only two salient exam­ples. It always makes sense to seek expla­na­tions, but there is no jus­ti­fi­ca­tion, no exten­u­a­tion.

    GRADE: C. Yes, I’m cher­ry-pick­ing from a gen­er­al­ly good inter­view where he says most­ly intel­li­gent things. Yet, still he HAS to attack Putin’s move. That seems to be some kind of red line for a lot of these “pow­er Left­ist” types.

    Vik­tor Orban- Inter­est­ing to see which way this guy is head­ing. He’s like the Erdo­gan of Europe, always try­ing to play all sides.

    https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/hungarys-orban-criticized-neutrality-ukraine-war-83688242

    Argu­ing that pro­vid­ing such assis­tance to Ukraine would draw Hun­gary into the war, Orban — while avoid­ing ever men­tion­ing Putin by name — has por­trayed him­self as the defend­er of his coun­try’s peace and secu­ri­ty while insist­ing that EU sanc­tions against Rus­sia not be extend­ed to its ener­gy sec­tor, of which Hun­gary is a major ben­e­fi­cia­ry.
    “The answer to the ques­tion of which side Hun­gary is on is that Hun­gary is on Hungary’s side,” Orban wrote Sat­ur­day on social media.
    While his approach has gained trac­tion among many of his sup­port­ers, Orban’s reluc­tance to act unam­bigu­ous­ly in sup­port of Ukraine and his insis­tence on main­tain­ing his Russ­ian eco­nom­ic inter­ests has led to frus­tra­tion and out­rage among oth­er Euro­pean lead­ers — not least the Ukrain­ian pres­i­dent him­self.
    GRADE: C. Seems to be doing the right thing so far, but he’s a fas­cist and not to be trust­ed.
    Vol­un­teers for Ukraine! Going to give this a sur­pris­ing­ly good grade, not because the Ukraine Vol­un­teers are doing good work, but because in this dark­est of times, few things have giv­en me more laughs than the red­dit page Vol­un­teers For Ukraine and the meta-com­men­tary about this page on Kiwi Farms, which mocks all the video-game play­ing, pink haired geeks of the flab­by West for pre­tend­ing to be war­riors for the West against the homo­pho­bic Putin. Hon­est­ly, these are two of the best places to fol­low the war. The red­dit page has been cracked down on by the mod­er­a­tors, but pre­vi­ous­ly had a lot of good dis­sent and mock­ery. They occa­sion­al­ly post things that the media denies… then lat­er admits. For exam­ple, the bomb­ing of the vol­un­teer legion bases was large­ly cov­ered up in the West, but it was admit­ted to on the red­dit page before I heard a hint of it in the West­ern media. There is also some­one who reg­u­lar­ly posts French reports on Russ­ian gains that bely the notion that “Ukraine is win­ning!’. These reports are sourced heav­i­ly from Ukrain­ian sources, so can’t be debunked as “Putin pro­pa­gan­da”.

    https://www.reddit.com/r/volunteersForUkraine/

    These are the reports I men­tioned. It’s been claimed that this is front for French intel­li­gence. Gen­er­al­ly, they have been more objec­tive and pre­dic­tive than the West­ern press, even though they have a pro-Ukraine bias.

    https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates

    WARNING: Kiwi Farms is a large­ly Free Speech Zone, where feel­ings are hurt and mean things are said by mean peo­ple. But in this case, some feel­ings real­ly do need to be hurt.

    https://kiwifarms.net/threads/r‑volunteersforukraine.113841/

    Rad­i­cal Islam:

    It has been dif­fi­cult to ascer­tain posi­tions by Islamist fac­tions on this war due to a gen­er­al press lock­down on sto­ries link­ing Mus­lim Broth­er­hood activ­i­ty in the Russ­ian sphere. How­ev­er, I found these arti­cles inter­est­ing. Sau­di Arabia’s unwill­ing­ness to bend the knee to Biden and inter­est in pric­ing oil in yuan may have some inter­est­ing con­se­quences down the road. Wouldn’t be sur­prised if we wind up with a “Sau­di Arab Spring” with­in a year or two.

    https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/24/hldukraine-war-allows-uae-to-bring-syrias-assad-in-from-the-cold

    Since its mil­i­tary inter­ven­tion in the Syr­i­an civ­il war in Sep­tem­ber 2015, one of Russia’s major for­eign pol­i­cy goals has been to con­vince Gulf Arab monar­chies to come to terms with the sur­vival of Syr­i­an Pres­i­dent Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and the reac­cep­tance of its “legit­i­ma­cy”.
    A host of devel­op­ments in Gulf-Syr­i­an rela­tions dur­ing the past few years, most recent­ly al-Assad’s vis­it to the Unit­ed Arab Emi­rates, indi­cate that this Russ­ian strat­e­gy has been quite suc­cess­ful.
    The key to under­stand­ing this bur­geon­ing rela­tion­ship, and the UAE’s open­ness to warmer rela­tions with al-Assad, is a shared antipa­thy to polit­i­cal Islam and pro-democ­ra­cy move­ments in the region.
    “The UAE vision for the region, in oppos­ing both Mus­lim pop­ulism and democ­ra­cy, looks an awful lot more like Putin’s vision than it does Washington’s, so it is nat­ur­al that the UAE is hedg­ing its US entan­gle­ments by keep­ing on the good side of Rus­sia and its clients,” said Juan Cole, pro­fes­sor of his­to­ry at the Uni­ver­si­ty of Michi­gan, in an inter­view with Al Jazeera.
    NOTE: Juan Cole is one of the most con­sis­tent MB apol­o­gists in the West. When terms like “shared antipa­thy to polit­i­cal Islam” are used, those are code­words for MB ter­ror groups.
    This next arti­cle is also inter­est­ing as it shows that the MB is using social media to try and cre­ate a split between the UAE and the Saud­is over oil pric­ing and pro­duc­tion.
    https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/50/1203/462938/AlAhram-Weekly/World/Gulf-energy-moment.aspx
    He added, “UAE is com­mit­ted to the OPEC+ agree­ment and its exist­ing month­ly pro­duc­tion adjust­ment mech­a­nism.” The minister’s tweet con­tra­dict­ed the ambassador’s state­ment but was in line with the Sau­di posi­tion to hon­our cur­rent pro­duc­tion lev­els, agreed on with Rus­sia and oth­er OPEC part­ners.
    Despite polit­i­cal inter­pre­ta­tions of the Gulf oil pro­duc­ers’ moves, seen by some as favour­ing Rus­sia over the Biden admin­is­tra­tion, they are main­ly dri­ven by forces of sup­ply and demand in the ener­gy mar­ket. The fun­da­men­tals of sup­ply and demand show that the mar­ket is not short of sup­ply; and any unnec­es­sary increase in pro­duc­tion might lead to a sup­ply glut and a price crash.
    The Amer­i­can admin­is­tra­tion is wor­ried about the prices of petrol at the pump, which hurt con­sumers and fuels infla­tion that could cost the Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty the mid-term elec­tion this year.
    Anoth­er inter­pre­ta­tion of last week’s mixed mes­sages from the UAE was prop­a­gat­ed main­ly by those who dig to find any dif­fer­ences in posi­tions between the two allies: the UAE and the KSA. Social media has been rife with such rhetoric, espe­cial­ly from accounts con­nect­ed with the Mus­lim Broth­er­hood. Yet a well-informed source in Abu Dhabi speak­ing on con­di­tion of anonymi­ty told Al-Ahram Week­ly that coor­di­na­tion between the two coun­tries is as close as usu­al.
    GRADE: Incom­plete. Mus­lim rad­i­cals don’t even believe in things like “time” and need reme­di­al stud­ies in many things. Why would they want to go to an infi­del class­room any­way? Referred to spe­cial edu­ca­tion class­es. How­ev­er, I would not dis­count the con­cept that they will win with any sce­nario. How did things work out in Iraq and Afghanistan?

    India and Modi:

    https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/in-india-a-u-s-partner-modi-s-base-is-inundated-with-anti-u-s-commentary-on-ukraine/ar-AAVCepa
    NEW DELHI — Turn on a tele­vi­sion in India this past month, and the argu­ments espoused by some of the country’s most pop­u­lar media per­son­al­i­ties fol­low a pat­tern: The Unit­ed States pro­voked Rus­sia into attack­ing Ukraine. The Amer­i­cans were pos­si­bly devel­op­ing bio­log­i­cal weapons in Ukraine. Joe Biden, the U.S. pres­i­dent who fum­bled the Amer­i­can with­draw­al from Afghanistan, has no busi­ness crit­i­ciz­ing India over the war he sparked in Ukraine.

    While the Russ­ian inva­sion has gal­va­nized pub­lic opin­ion against Pres­i­dent Vladimir Putin in many West­ern coun­tries, it has had a strik­ing­ly dif­fer­ent effect in India, reflect­ing a gulf between the Unit­ed States and the world’s largest democ­ra­cy in how each pub­lic per­ceives the war, Rus­sia and the West.
    In recent weeks, some Indi­an Eng­lish-lan­guage news­pa­pers cater­ing to wealthy urban lib­er­als have car­ried edi­to­ri­als nudg­ing Prime Min­is­ter Naren­dra Modi to take a tougher stance against Putin. But on main­stream talk shows and in the pages of mag­a­zines pop­u­lar with Modi’s right-wing base — a far larg­er audi­ence — it has most­ly been fire and fury direct­ed toward the Unit­ed States, por­trayed as the cul­prit and insti­ga­tor of yet anoth­er inter­na­tion­al con­fla­gra­tion.
    “The Amer­i­can media, the Amer­i­can estab­lish­ment wants to con­ceal this: They don’t like this charge of hav­ing any­thing to do with bio­log­i­cal weapons,” Arnab Goswa­mi, the star anchor of India’s top-rat­ed news chan­nel, Repub­lic TV, said in a mono­logue ear­li­er this month after Moscow and Wash­ing­ton exchanged accu­sa­tions about bioweapons pos­si­bly being researched and used in Ukraine.
    “But I don’t believe in the con­cept of Amer­i­cans declar­ing them­selves inno­cent, because the Amer­i­cans are the ones who have a pro­found his­to­ry of using the worst chem­i­cal weapons, on the most inno­cent peo­ple,” Goswa­mi con­tin­ued. He took a breath, then furi­ous­ly recount­ed the U.S. government’s record of drop­ping the atom­ic bomb in Hiroshi­ma and spray­ing the her­bi­cide Agent Orange dur­ing the Viet­nam War, which dev­as­tat­ed forests and caused birth defects.
    Mean­while, in a stu­dio east of Del­hi, Rahul Shiv­shankar, Goswami’s com­peti­tor on the Times Now chan­nel, won­dered whether the West had hap­pi­ly “bait­ed” Putin into launch­ing a risky inva­sion and forced Rus­sia to “do what it had to do.”

    “Ukrain­ian res­i­dents are today fac­ing the brunt, and the West is look­ing at all the fun,” Shiv­shankar said. In his month­ly news­pa­per col­umn, the TV star wrote that “the trig­ger for the war isn’t Putin,” but NATO’s encroach­ment into Russia’s sphere of influ­ence. “Amer­i­ca con­sid­ers the Caribbean its back­yard, Chi­na con­sid­ers the South Chi­na Sea as its own,” Shiv­shankar wrote.
    The com­men­tary does not nec­es­sar­i­ly reflect the pol­i­cy of the Modi admin­is­tra­tion, which has gen­er­al­ly sought to strength­en rela­tions with the Unit­ed States and main­tain a neu­tral posi­tion through­out the Ukraine con­flict. Despite the West’s attempts to iso­late Moscow, India has repeat­ed­ly abstained from con­demn­ing Rus­sia, a decades-long weapons sup­pli­er, and con­tin­ues to buy Russ­ian oil. But the war in Ukraine has resur­faced an unmis­tak­able strain of anti-Amer­i­can skep­ti­cism that has coursed for decades across India’s polit­i­cal spec­trum.
    GRADE: B. Tak­ing one grade off for Modi/RSS ties, but still, I com­plete­ly under­stand the Indi­an posi­tion. The US is like­ly to sup­port Kash­miri jihadists against the Indi­an peo­ple. It was the vac­u­um of action against the Kash­mir jihad and oth­er jihads through­out India that lead direct­ly to Modi, just as sim­i­lar inac­tion against jihadists in Amer­i­ca and Europe lead direct­ly to Trump. Xin­jiang, the Rohingya in Bur­ma, Pankisi Gorge, it’s all the same game. Why should they back us in any­thing? Biden is an embar­rass­ment: if you real­ly want to take on Rus­sia, shouldn’t you prob­a­bly line up a) the Saud­is b) Chi­na and c) India on your side before esca­lat­ing things in Ukraine? Unbe­liev­able!
    Next up, we come to my favorite social media post of this social media war unlike any oth­er. Chi­nese broad­cast­er dunks all over Joe Biden and his pol­i­cy of try­ing to turn Chi­na against Rus­sia. Again, isn’t this stuff you do BEFORE the war pops off? It has become obvi­ous over time what the dif­fer­ence between Trump and Biden is: Trump favored sid­ing with Rus­sia to take down Chi­na, Biden favors sid­ing with Chi­na to take down Rus­sia, THEN tak­ing down Chi­na. But, it’s almost like a coun­try like Chi­na that has had to play these games sev­er­al thou­sand years before the US was a thing can see through such machi­na­tions.

    https://twitter.com/LiuXininBeijing/status/1505043155682402306?cxt=HHwWhICpodWx_uIpAAAA

    Can you help me fight your friend so that I can con­cen­trate on fight­ing you lat­er?

    GRADE: For this line only, an easy A+. Line of the year.

    Ralph Nad­er:
    In a huge upset vic­to­ry, the best take I’ve seen from some­one I expect­ed TERRIBLE takes from, here we have Ralph f’in Nad­er with a pret­ty sol­id arti­cle. I’m shocked, quite frankly.

    https://www.commondreams.org/views/2022/02/27/nobody-wins-conflict-over-ukraine

    When two scor­pi­ons are in a bot­tle, they both lose. This is the pre­ventable dan­ger that is grow­ing dai­ly, with no end game in sight, between the two nuclear super­pow­ers, led by dic­ta­tor Vladimir Putin and de fac­to sole decider, Joe Biden.
    This is a dan­ger­ous recipe for an out-of-con­trol esca­la­tion, much as it was in the lead-up to World War I.
    Putin’s first argu­ment is, Wash­ing­ton invent­ed the mod­el of aggres­sive, ille­gal inva­sions, and destruc­tion of dis­tant coun­tries that nev­er threat­ened U.S. secu­ri­ty. Mil­lions have died, been injured, and sick­ened in defense­less coun­tries attacked by U.S. armed forces. George W. Bush and Dick Cheney killed over a mil­lion inno­cent Iraqis and dev­as­tat­ed the coun­try in so many ways that schol­ars called it a “socio­cide.”
    Putin’s sec­ond argu­ment is that Rus­sia is being threat­ened on its sen­si­tive west­ern bor­der, which had been invad­ed twice by Ger­many and caused the loss of 50 mil­lion Russ­ian lives. Soon after the Sovi­et Union col­lapsed, the West’s mil­i­tary alliance against Rus­sia began mov­ing east. Under Bill Clin­ton, NATO (The North Atlantic Treaty Orga­ni­za­tion) signed up Poland, Hun­gary, and the Czech Repub­lic in 1999 lead­ing to major arms sales by the U.S. giant muni­tions cor­po­ra­tions.
    More recent­ly, Putin sees U.S. sol­diers in these coun­tries, ever clos­er U.S. mis­sile launch­ers, U.S.-led joint naval exer­cis­es in the Baltic Sea, and inti­ma­tions that Ukraine and Geor­gia could soon join NATO. (Imag­ine if the Rus­sians were to have such a mil­i­tary pres­ence around the U.S. bor­ders.)
    Even often hawk­ish New York Times colum­nists Thomas Fried­man and Bret Stephens made this point this week about the brazen U.S. his­to­ry of mil­i­tary hypocrisy while tear­ing into Putin. Stephens brought up the Mon­roe Doc­trine over the entire West­ern Hemi­sphere, in rais­ing repeat­ed­ly the ques­tion, “Who are We?”
    The chess game between Rus­sia and the West has become more dead­ly with Putin’s mil­i­tary moves fol­lowed by imme­di­ate West­ern sanc­tions against some Russ­ian banks and oli­garchs close to Putin. Trav­el bans and freez­ing the com­ple­tion of the sec­ond major nat­ur­al gas pipeline from Rus­sia to Ger­many are in place with promis­es of much more severe eco­nom­ic retal­i­a­tion by Biden.
    These sanc­tions can become a two-way street. West­ern Europe needs Russ­ian oil and gas, Russ­ian wheat, and essen­tial Russ­ian min­er­als such as lithi­um, cobalt, and nick­el. Sanc­tions against Rus­sia will soon boomerang in terms of high­er oil and gas prices for Euro­peans and Amer­i­cans, more infla­tion, wors­en­ing sup­ply chains, and the dread­ed “eco­nom­ic uncer­tain­ty” afflict­ing stock mar­kets and con­sumer spend­ing.
    The cor­po­rate glob­al econ­o­my gave us inter­de­pen­dence on oth­er nations, instead of domes­tic self-reliance, under the frame­work of cor­po­rate-man­aged free trade agree­ments.
    So how many bil­lions of dol­lars in costs and a weak­ened econ­o­my will Joe Biden tol­er­ate as the price of anti-Putin sanc­tions that will blow back on the Amer­i­can peo­ple? How much suf­fer­ing will he tol­er­ate being inflict­ed on the long-suf­fer­ing Russ­ian peo­ple? What will be the impact on the civil­ian pop­u­la­tion of more severe sanc­tions? And who is he to talk as if he doesn’t have to be autho­rized by Con­gress to go fur­ther into this state of bel­liger­ence, short of send­ing sol­diers, which he said he would not do?
    Is Con­gress to be left as a cheer­leader, wash­ing its hands of its con­sti­tu­tion­al over­sight and for­eign pol­i­cy duties? Also, watch Repub­li­cans and Democ­rats in Con­gress uni­fy to whoop through more mon­ey for the bloat­ed mil­i­tary bud­get, as point­ed out by mil­i­tary ana­lyst, Michael Klare. What ener­gy will be left for Biden’s pend­ing “Build Back Bet­ter” infra­struc­ture, social safe­ty net, and cli­mate cri­sis leg­is­la­tion?
    In recent weeks, the State Depart­ment said it rec­og­nizes Russia’s legit­i­mate secu­ri­ty con­cerns but not its expan­sion­ism. Well, what is wrong with a cease­fire fol­lowed by sup­port for a treaty “guar­an­tee­ing neu­tral­i­ty for Ukraine, sim­i­lar to the enforced neu­tral­i­ty for Aus­tria since the Cold War’s ear­ly years,” as Nation pub­lish­er and Rus­sia spe­cial­ist Kat­ri­na van­den Heuv­el urged. (See: Kat­ri­na van­den Heuvel’s Wash­ing­ton Post arti­cle and her recent Nation piece).
    Putin, unable to get over the breakup of the Sovi­et Union, prob­a­bly has impe­r­i­al ambi­tions to dom­i­nate in Russia’s back­yard. Biden has inher­it­ed and accept­ed the U.S. Empire’s ambi­tions in many oth­er nation’s back­yards. Events have polar­ized this con­flict over Ukraine, which is not a secu­ri­ty inter­est for the U.S., into two dom­i­nant egos—Putin and Biden—neither of whom want to appear weak or to back down.
    This is a dan­ger­ous recipe for an out-of-con­trol esca­la­tion, much as it was in the lead-up to World War I. Nei­ther the peo­ple nor the par­lia­ments mat­tered then, as seems to be the case today.
    Putin isn’t like­ly to make a cost-ben­e­fit assess­ment of each day’s mil­i­tarism. But Biden bet­ter do so. Oth­er­wise, he will be man­aged by Putin’s dai­ly moves, instead of insist­ing on seri­ous nego­ti­a­tions. The Min­sk II Peace Accords of Feb­ru­ary 2015 bro­kered by Ger­many, France, and the Unit­ed Nations that Rus­sia and Ukraine agreed to before falling apart due to dis­agree­ments over who should take the first steps, still makes for a use­ful frame­work.
    It is too late to revis­it the accords to stop the inva­sion. But it should be pro­posed to intro­duce a cli­mate for wag­ing peace. Already, New York Gov­er­nor Kathy Hochul has spo­ken about an increase in cyber­at­tacks and ran­somware demands in her state in recent weeks. Has Biden put that ris­ing cer­tain­ty in his self-described decades-long for­eign pol­i­cy exper­tise? Watch out for what you can’t stop, Joe.

    Ro Khan­na: Let’s fin­ish up with our most dis­ap­point­ing stu­dent this semes­ter. Ro Khan­na was quite a sol­id crit­ic of the Ukrain­ian Nazis before the war. But now?
    https://www.americanbazaaronline.com/2022/03/24/ro-khanna-wants-india-to-pick-sides-in-russias-ukraine-war-449002/
    Not­ing that there is a bipar­ti­san con­sen­sus that they are appalled by India absten­tions on UN Secu­ri­ty Coun­cil vote over Russia’s inva­sion of Ukraine, Khan­na said, it makes it all the much hard­er.
    “And it is some­thing that I hope India will still con­sid­er,” he said. “I mean look we’re not even ask­ing them yet for to impose sanc­tions or to stop their defense.”
    “But to refuse to con­demn Putin’s bomb­ing of moth­ers and chil­dren in Ukraine, how can you look at what’s hap­pen­ing and not say that’s wrong, that’s immoral, that’s uncon­scionable, and vote with the world in con­demn­ing it,” Khan­na said.

    GRADE: A-. A+ work, but I can’t help but dock some points just for being Nad­er.

    Posted by cinque anon | March 29, 2022, 10:58 am
  2. @cinque anon–

    I give Nad­er a C- and would put the rest in prison for the rest of their lives.

    Aside from say­ing NOTHING about the BW pres­ence and its large inter­sec­tion with the “Oswald Insti­tute of Virol­o­gy” expo­si­tion done by YT, NONE of these sphinc­ters has said one god­damn word about the Nazis in Ukraine.

    And they are dom­i­nant.

    Hell, F* Biden was deeply in the mix with Geof­frey Pyatt and Andriy Parubiy–the founder of what became Svo­bo­da.

    Svo­bo­da’s C14 mili­tia, which has received gov­ern­ment fund­ing, has (along with Azov’s Druzhi­na Mili­tia) got police pow­ers in 21 Ukrain­ian cities, includ­ing Kiev.

    C14 is named after the Four­teen Words, an inter­na­tion­al White Suprema­cist anthem, mint­ed by David Lane, who drove the get away car in the Order’s mur­der of Alan Berg.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourteen_Words

    And this is just ONE of the many Nazi con­nec­tions.

    F* Nan­cy Pelosi greet­ed Zelen­sky with the salute used by Ban­der­a’s troops and now the Ukrain­ian Army and Police.

    https://spitfirelist.com/news/nancy-pelosi-channels-stepan-bandera/

    And NONE of these people–nor much of any­one else, includ­ing the so-called “pro­gres­sive sector”–has said one god­damn word about this.

    Grade for the whole bunch: See Me After Class!!

    Keep Up the Great Work!

    Dave

    Posted by Dave Emory | March 29, 2022, 4:17 pm
  3. Yeah, my grad­ing scale was most­ly for par­o­dy pur­pos­es and its main pur­pose was to show the “stal­warts of the Amer­i­can Left” being even shit­ti­er than mon­sters like Orban on this top­ic. Nad­er is just a bro­ken clock who hap­pened to get this one most­ly right.

    Posted by cinque anon | April 5, 2022, 8:47 am

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