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Snowden’s Ride, Part 11: The “Deep Fifth Column”–Old Leaks Shed New Light on the Present

 

Dave Emory’s entire life­time of work is avail­able on a flash dri­ve that can be obtained here. (The flash dri­ve includes the anti-fas­cist books avail­able on this site.)

COMMENT: A term that is essen­tial for users of this web­site to com­pre­hend is “fifth col­umn.”  The advance and suc­cess of fas­cism pri­or to, and dur­ing, World War II would not have been pos­si­ble with­out the aid of the fifth columns.

It is for that rea­son that books about fifth col­umn fas­cist move­ments and activ­i­ty are includ­ed in the “Books” cat­e­go­ry.

Vital­ly impor­tant, though long for­got­ten, books like Under Cov­er and Cairo to Dam­as­cus by John Roy Carl­son, Falange–The Secret Axis Army in the Amer­i­c­as by Alan Chase,  Armies of Spies by Joseph Golomb, The Nazis Go Under­ground by Curt Riess, and Tri­umph of Trea­son by Pier Cot shed light on the pro­found pres­ence of Nazis, fas­cists and their sym­pa­thiz­ers with­in coun­tries tar­get­ed for fas­cist con­quest.

As back­ground to this dis­cus­sion, we might coin the term “deep fifth column”–powerful and dom­i­nant forces that saw fascism–“corporatism” as Mus­soli­ni termed it–as a won­der­ful solu­tion to what they saw as “problems”–democracy and trade unions among them.

(Par­en­thet­i­cal­ly, we note that ours is a failed civilization–one that has failed to take into account the great eco­nom­ic, polit­i­cal and intel­lec­tu­al pow­er behind fas­cism. World War II is seen by our cul­ture as an unfor­tu­nate event, caused by a “bunch of weirdos, who got out of hand.” It is for this rea­son that we include books about the alto­geth­er dead­ly (and sad­ly eclipsed) forces that caused the blood­let­ting in the Sec­ond World War, much of the glob­al car­nage that has ensued since, and the anni­hi­lat­ing future that awaits our civ­i­liza­tion, if polit­i­cal iner­tia pre­vails.

We also note that much of the suc­cess of The Under­ground Reich has been Ger­many’s mas­ter­ful strate­gic use of anti-com­mu­nism and class war­fare as a gam­bit to infil­trate and co-opt the pow­er elites of coun­tries tar­get­ed for sub­ver­sion. Where­as anti-com­mu­nism and class strug­gle are seen by Amer­i­can and oth­er elites as ends in them­selves, to real­ize “cor­po­ratism”–Ger­many has used those as vehi­cles for con­quest.)

We also note in this con­text that the fifth columns were nev­er addressed in many coun­tries. Just as Ger­many was nev­er real­ly de-Naz­i­fied, the fifth columns were nev­er root­ed out in many of the oth­er West­ern coun­tries, includ­ing the Unit­ed States, Unit­ed King­dom and France. The fifth columns–the deep fifth columns in particular–were crit­i­cal to the enabling and for­ma­tion of The Under­ground Reich.

Lis­ten­ers and users of this web­site should make it a point to down­load, print and read the books deal­ing with the “deep fifth col­umn.”

In our recent, volu­mi­nous analy­sis of “Snow­den’s Ride”–the Nazi psy-op so suc­cess­ful­ly per­pe­trat­ed by Eddie The Friend­ly Spook and the forces who have man­aged his escapade–we are look­ing at the activ­i­ties of an Under­ground Reich milieu/intelligence net­work. Our series on this is long, com­plex and mul­ti-lay­ered: Part I, Part II, Part III, Part IV, Part V, Part VI, Part VII, Part VIII, Part IX, Part X, Part XI, Part XII, Part XIII, Part XIV, Part XV, Part XVI, Part XVII.

It is less clear pre­cise­ly who is the imme­di­ate intel­li­gence con­troller of Eddie the Friend­ly Spook, although BND is almost cer­tain­ly involved and may be the ulti­mate exec­u­tive author­i­ty. The prob­a­bil­i­ty is very strong that a “deep fifth col­umn” with­in U.S. intel­li­gence, mil­i­tary, cor­po­rate and polit­i­cal struc­ture is involved.

A recent (and pre­dictably slant­ed) Wall Street Jour­nal arti­cle dealt with a leak of Naval Intel­li­gence secrets dur­ing the course of World War II.

Dis­clos­ing the piv­otal fact that U.S. intel­li­gence had cracked the Japan­ese “White Code” (not spec­i­fied in the WSJ arti­cle), “Colonel” Robert R. McCormick­’s Chica­go Tri­bune leaked vital infor­ma­tion for the sec­ond time in less than a year.

Hav­ing pre­vi­ous­ly leaked the Rain­bow Five con­tin­gency plan for U.S. mobi­liza­tion and war-mak­ing doc­u­ments for the Sec­ond World War, McCormick was a mem­ber of Amer­i­ca First. Osten­si­bly iso­la­tion­ist and “patri­ot­ic” in out­look, the orga­ni­za­tion was, in fact, active­ly fund­ed by Third Reich intel­li­gence and com­prised (for the most part) of doc­tri­naire fas­cists who loved Hitler and Mus­soli­ni and hat­ed Franklin Delano Roo­sevelt with a pas­sion.

(For a good under­stand­ing of the active pro-fas­cist nature of Amer­i­ca First, open Under Cov­er by John Roy Carl, son and use the “find” func­tion on your com­put­er, search­ing “Amer­i­ca First.” This will yield a good under­stand­ing of the nature of that orga­ni­za­tion and its mem­bers.)

As dis­cussed in AFA #11, the prob­a­ble source of the leak of the Rain­bow Five pro­gram was Gen­er­al Albert Wede­mey­er, one of its pri­ma­ry authors and an active Amer­i­ca Firster. (See text excerpts below for infor­ma­tion about Wede­mey­er and the leak of Rain­bow Five.)

A lynch­pin of the Chi­na Lob­by, the MacArthur group in the mil­i­tary and the milieu that coa­lesced into the  John Birch Soci­ety, Wede­mey­er stud­ied at the Ger­man mil­i­tary acad­e­my, begin­ning in 1936, rent­ing his apart­ment from Ger­hard Ross­bach, one of the lead­ers of the Brown­shirts (SA.) Lat­er (as dic­sussed in AFA #11) Ross­bach went to work for the CIA in the post­war peri­od. 

Yet anoth­er point about Wede­mey­er set forth in AFA #11 is the fact that Ronald Rea­gan appoint­ed Wede­mey­er as a spe­cial mil­i­tary advis­er. 

In a book excerpt below, Wede­mey­er blames the leak of Rain­bow Five on–of course–Franklin Delano Roo­sevelt, claim­ing that it was part of Roo­sevelt’s plan to get the Unit­ed States into World War II. Roo­sevelt was con­ve­nient­ly dead by the time Wede­mey­er held forth. (This is a major claim of the deep fifth col­umn through the decades, since picked up and ampli­fied by the con­spir­a­cy crowd.)

In his pre­dictably self-serv­ing analy­sis, Wede­mey­er does reveal some­thing inter­est­ing about the net­work­ing in which McCormick engaged. Wede­mey­er main­tains that McCormick sent the Rain­bow Five infor­ma­tion direct­ly to Hitler!

Again, dis­cus­sion of Snow­den’s Ride, per se, is beyond the scope of this post. It is, quite clear­ly, a fascist/Underground Reich oper­a­tion, with the ulti­mate exec­u­tive author­i­ty being the BND, in all prob­a­bil­i­ty.

It may be that an Under­ground Reich fifth col­umn with­in U.S. intel­li­gence is involved, ulti­mate­ly answer­ing to BND.

One impor­tant pos­si­bil­i­ty entails Peter Thiel, whose Palan­tir com­pa­ny appears to be the devel­op­er of the PRISM soft­ware. Thiel embod­ies the con­cept of the deep fifth col­umn. Ger­man born, son of a chem­i­cal engi­neer from Frank­furt (read “I.G. Far­ben”), Thiel has open­ly negat­ed the con­cept of democ­ra­cy, hates Oba­ma and is the chief finan­cial backer of cryp­to-Nazi Ron Paul, to whose cam­paign Eddie the Friend­ly Spook con­tributed. The “Paulis­tini­ans” are to be found at many lev­els of this con­cate­na­tion.

In addi­tion, Alex Karp, the CEO of Palan­tir and some­one who appears to have been cen­tral­ly involved in the devel­op­ment of Thiel’s career also has roots in Frank­furt Ger­many! (See text excerpts below.)

NOTE: Palan­tir offi­cial­ly claims that “their PRISM” is NOT the same PRISM in the focal point of the Snowden/NSA imbroglio. We feel this claim is laugh­able, frankly. The notion that the intel­li­gence ser­vices are using TWO counter-ter­ror soft­ware pro­grams with iden­ti­cal names is not cred­i­ble. Had a com­pa­ny devel­oped a counter-ter­ror soft­ware pro­gram for use by the intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty and called it “PRISM,” there would have been lit­i­ga­tion. The major tech com­pa­nies are NOTHING if not liti­gious, and Thiel and com­pa­ny have PLENTY of mon­ey!

That Oba­ma is deal­ing with a deep fifth col­umn in these leaks is a pos­si­bil­i­ty to be seri­ous­ly con­sid­ered.

“Echoes From a Past Leak Probe” by Jess Bravin; Wall Street Jour­nal; 8/7/2013.

New­ly released doc­u­ments pro­vide a road map of how the gov­ern­ment tried to mount a no-holds-barred legal attack against jour­nal­ists sus­pect­ed of leak­ing mil­i­tary secrets.

But the mem­os weren’t about the cur­rent-day Bradley Man­ning case. They came after a dis­clo­sure 71 years ago about World War II’s Bat­tle of Mid­way and show the U.S. has long wres­tled with how to square nation­al secu­ri­ty and press free­dom.

The Jus­tice Depart­men­t’s Office of Legal Coun­sel, which advis­es the exec­u­tive branch on the extent of its own pow­ers, pub­lished in late July a selec­tion of pre­vi­ous­ly secret legal opin­ions span­ning from 1933 to 1977. Among them were mem­os about a June 7, 1942, scoop in the Chica­go Tri­bune by cor­re­spon­dent Stan­ley John­ston, who saw a naval intel­li­gence file while trav­el­ing with the Pacif­ic Fleet.

Pen­ta­gon offi­cials were stunned by the head­line, “U.S. Navy Knew in Advance All About Jap Fleet,” when they saw the sto­ry, which also ran in the Wash­ing­ton Times-Her­ald. The arti­cle all but revealed one of the war’s great­est secrets: that the U.S. had cracked the Japan­ese navy’s code. It report­ed that Japan­ese fleet strength “was well known in Amer­i­can naval cir­cles,” that the U.S. Navy knew the Japan­ese were like­ly to stage a feint against the Aleut­ian Islands, and that “the advance infor­ma­tion enabled the Amer­i­can Navy to make full use of air attacks on the approach­ing Japan­ese ships.”
Navy Sec­re­tary Frank Knox wrote to Attor­ney Gen­er­al Fran­cis Bid­dle, demand­ing indict­ments. The head­line alone “dis­clos­es secret and con­fi­den­tial infor­ma­tion to the detri­ment of our nation­al defense,” Mr. Knox wrote. Mr. Bid­dle then asked staff for advice, result­ing in the just-released mem­os. . . .

. . . . The mem­os are notice­ably silent on one pos­si­bly per­ti­nent point: Tri­bune’s pub­lish­er, Col. Robert R. McCormick, was an incen­di­ary antag­o­nist of the New Deal and, before Pearl Har­bor at least, a vocif­er­ous oppo­nent of inter­ven­tion in World War II. . . .

“The Big Leak” by Thomas Flem­ing; Amer­i­can Her­itage Mag­a­zine; Decem­ber 1987.

EXCERPT: . . . .Gen­er­al Wede­mey­er, still erect and men­tal­ly alert, recalled the atmos­phere he encoun­tered when he walked into the Muni­tions Build­ing at 7:30 A.M. on Decem­ber 5. “Offi­cers were stand­ing in clumps, talk­ing in low tones. Silence fell, and they dis­persed the moment they saw me. My sec­re­tary, her eyes red from weep­ing, hand­ed me a copy of the Times Her­ald with Manly’s sto­ry on the front page. I could not have been more appalled and astound­ed if a bomb had been dropped on Wash­ing­ton.”

For the next sev­er­al days Wede­mey­er almost wished a bomb had been dropped and had land­ed on him. He was the chief sus­pect in the leak of Rain­bow Five, which with­in the closed doors of the War Depart­ment was called the Vic­to­ry Pro­gram. He had strong ties to Amer­i­ca First, the lead­ing anti­war group in the nation. Both he and his father-in-law, Lt. Gen. Stan­ley D. Embick, were known to be oppo­nents of Roosevelt’s for­eign pol­i­cy, which they thought was lead­ing the Unit­ed States into a pre­ma­ture and dan­ger­ous war. . . .

. . . . Lat­er in this tumul­tuous morn­ing two FBI agents appeared in Wedemeyer’s office and exam­ined the con­tents of his safe. Their eyes widened when they dis­cov­ered a copy of the Vic­to­ry Pro­gram with every­thing that had appeared in the news­pa­pers under­lined. The sweat­ing Wede­mey­er explained that he had just done the under­lin­ing to get a clear idea of how much had been revealed. The two agents began an inter­ro­ga­tion of Wede­mey­er and oth­er Army and Navy offi­cers that con­tin­ued for months.

Sev­er­al Army staff offi­cers said they strong­ly sus­pect­ed Wede­mey­er of being the leak­er. An anony­mous let­ter, obvi­ous­ly writ­ten by an insid­er and addressed to the Sec­re­tary of War, accused him and Gen­er­al Embick. Wedemeyer’s prospects grew even bleak­er when the FBI dis­cov­ered he had recent­ly deposit­ed sev­er­al thou­sand dol­lars in the Rig­gs Nation­al Bank in Wash­ing­ton. He explained it was an inher­i­tance and went on man­ful­ly to admit to the FBI that he knew Gen. Robert E. Wood, Charles A. Lind­bergh, and oth­er lead­ers of Amer­i­ca First and agreed with some of their views. He often attend­ed Amer­i­ca First meet­ings, although nev­er in uni­form. . . .

. . . . On Decem­ber 7, 1941, the ques­tion of Rain­bow Five’s impact on Amer­i­can pol­i­tics became moot. Japan­ese planes swooped out of the dawn sky to dev­as­tate the Amer­i­can fleet at Pearl Har­bor. The Vic­to­ry Pro­gram had envis­aged devot­ing almost all of America’s mil­i­tary strength to defeat­ing Hitler. Japan, in that sce­nario, was to be han­dled by defen­sive strate­gies short of war. . . .

In and Out of Hol­ly­wood: A Biog­ra­pher’s Mem­oir by Charles High­am; p. 212.

EXCERPT: . . . . [Bur­ton Wheel­er], see­ing the plan as a breach of neu­tral­i­ty and proof of Roo­sevelt’s ille­gal and supra­con­sti­tu­tion­al behav­ior, in turn took the plan to anoth­er iso­la­tion­ist, Robert R. McCormick, own­er and pub­lish­er of the Chica­go Tri­bune, who at once pub­lished it on the front page.

Simul­ta­ne­ous­ly, McCormick sent the plan to Hitler by West­ern Union. Hitler met with Joachim von Ribben­trop, his for­eign min­is­ter, and asked him if the exis­tence of the plan called for imme­di­ate action. . . .

“How Team of Geeks Cracked Spy Trade” by Siob­han Ghor­ban; The Wall Street Jour­nal; 9/4/2009.

EXCERPT: . . . Palan­tir CEO Mr. Karp says such crit­i­cism does­n’t trou­ble him. He says the com­pa­ny is already expand­ing rapid­ly.

Palan­tir’s roots date back to 2000, when Mr. Karp returned to the U.S. after liv­ing for years in Frank­furt, where he earned his doc­tor­ate in Ger­man social phi­los­o­phy and dis­cov­ered a tal­ent for invest­ing. He recon­nect­ed with a bud­dy from Stan­ford Law School, Peter Thiel, the bil­lion­aire founder of online pay­ment com­pa­ny Pay­Pal.

In 2003, Mr. Thiel pitched an idea to Mr. Karp: Could they build soft­ware that would uncov­er ter­ror net­works using the approach Pay­Pal had devised to fight Russ­ian cyber­crim­i­nals?

Pay­Pal’s soft­ware could make con­nec­tions between fraud­u­lent pay­ments that on the sur­face seemed unre­lat­ed. By fol­low­ing such leads, Pay­Pal was able to iden­ti­fy sus­pect cus­tomers and uncov­er cyber­crime net­works. The com­pa­ny saw a ten­fold decrease in fraud loss­es after it launched the soft­ware, while many com­peti­tors strug­gled to beat back cheaters.

Mr. Thiel want­ed to design soft­ware to tack­le ter­ror­ism because at the time, he says, the gov­ern­men­t’s response to issues like air­port secu­ri­ty was increas­ing­ly “night­mar­ish.” The two launched Palan­tir in 2004 with three oth­er investors, but they attract­ed lit­tle inter­est from ven­ture-cap­i­tal firms. The com­pa­ny’s $30 mil­lion start-up costs were large­ly bankrolled by Mr. Thiel and his own ven­ture-cap­i­tal fund.

They mod­eled Palan­tir’s cul­ture on Google’s, with catered meals of ahi tuna and a free-form 24-hour work­place wired so 16 peo­ple can play the Halo video game. The kitchen is stocked by request with such items as Pep­to Bis­mol and glass bot­tles of Mex­i­can Coca Cola sweet­ened with sug­ar not corn syrup. The com­pa­ny recent­ly host­ed its own bat­tle of the bands.

One of the ven­ture firms that reject­ed Palan­tir’s over­tures steered the com­pa­ny to In-Q-Tel, a non­prof­it ven­ture-cap­i­tal firm estab­lished by the CIA a decade ago to tap inno­va­tion that could be used for intel­li­gence work. As Sil­i­con Val­ley’s ven­ture fund­ing dries up, In-Q-Tel says it has seen a surge of requests from start-ups in the last year or so, many of which now see the gov­ern­ment as an alter­nate mon­ey stream.

In-Q-Tel invest­ed about $2 mil­lion in Palan­tir and pro­vid­ed a crit­i­cal entreé to the CIA and oth­er agen­cies. For his first spy meet­ing in 2005, Mr. Karp shed his track suit for a sports coat. He arrived at an agency — he won’t say which one — and was imme­di­ate­ly “freaked out” by secu­ri­ty offi­cers guard­ing the build­ing with guns. In a win­dow­less, code-locked room, he intro­duced him­self to the first offi­cial he met: “Hi, I’m Alex Karp,” Mr. Karp said, offer­ing his hand. No response. “I did­n’t know you real­ly don’t ask their names,” he says now.

Mr. Karp showed the group a pro­to­type. The soft­ware was sim­i­lar to Pay­Pal’s fraud-detec­tion sys­tem. But instead of iden­ti­fy­ing and con­nect­ing cyber crim­i­nals, it focused on two hypo­thet­i­cal ter­ror sus­pects and fol­lowed their activ­i­ties, includ­ing trav­el and mon­ey trans­fers.

After the demo, he was pep­pered with skep­ti­cal ques­tions: Is any­one at your com­pa­ny cleared to work with clas­si­fied infor­ma­tion? Have you ever worked with intel­li­gence agen­cies? Do you have senior advis­ers who have worked with intel­li­gence agen­cies? Do you have a sales force that is cleared to work with clas­si­fied infor­ma­tion? The answer every time: no.

But the group was suf­fi­cient­ly intrigued by the demo, and In-Q-Tel arranged for Palan­tir engi­neers to meet direct­ly with intel­li­gence ana­lysts, to help build a com­pre­hen­sive search tool from scratch. . . .

 

Discussion

5 comments for “Snowden’s Ride, Part 11: The “Deep Fifth Column”–Old Leaks Shed New Light on the Present”

  1. Thank you so much for this mar­velous post. I’ve down­loaded all the books you rec­om­mend­ed but it’ll take me a while to get through them.

    The who and the why have always been evi­dent. It’s the HOW that made the pig’s tail curl. (Trans­la­tion from a Span­ish apho­rism. The pig’s tail was straight until he encoun­tered a prob­lem that was so dif­fi­cult to solve the intel­lec­tu­al effort made it’s tail curl.) Like 911! We know who and why but exact­ly how it was done is any­body’s guess because we sim­ply don’t have access to all the infor­ma­tion. Some­times not even the peo­ple direct­ly involved know exact­ly what part they’ve played in the oper­a­tion.

    That’s what hap­pens to me with the con­cept of the Under­ground Reich and the means by which it will take over the world. When Bush (Dubya) start­ed increas­ing the deficit and for­eign debt short­ly after 911 I knew it was being pur­pose­ly done to crash the US econ­o­my. It was almost like a car­bon copy of the method they used in sev­er­al Latin Amer­i­can coun­tries back in the 80’s and 90’s. Only in our case the mon­ey was sim­ply stolen by the politi­cians where­as in the US I saw it invest­ed in the mil­i­tary and I kept ask­ing myself: “Why? What is the pur­pose of such a large mil­i­tary if not to ini­ti­ate a large scale war?”…. When you talked about the destruc­tion and balka­niza­tion of the US I was doubt­ful pre­cise­ly because of this but the oth­er day I came across the fol­low­ing arti­cle:

    http://theeconomiccollapseblog.com/archives/are-these-the-last-days-of-the-u-s-marine-corps

    “Are These The Last Days Of The U.S. Marine Corps?
    By Michael Sny­der, on August 11th, 2013

    Are the cur­rent per­son­nel cuts the begin­ning of the end for the U.S. Marines? Could these actu­al­ly be the last days of the U.S. Marine Corps? A decade ago, such a notion would have been absolute­ly unthink­able, but times have changed. The Marine Corps was already in the process of draw­ing down from a peak of 202,100 Marines to 182,100, and now Defense Sec­re­tary Chuck Hagel is warn­ing that the sequester cuts may force the Army to be cut down to a size of 380,000 and the Marine Corps to be cut down to a size of 150,000. Unfor­tu­nate­ly for the Marines, even larg­er cuts may even­tu­al­ly be com­ing. Many in the Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion and in the Pen­ta­gon are now open­ly ques­tion­ing whether there will be an impor­tant role for the Marines to play in the future.”

    Do you think this is what will hap­pen to the US mil­i­tary as a whole? First they start­ed out­sourc­ing jobs, then they start­ed mov­ing com­pa­nies to oth­er coun­tries. After 911 they bor­rowed tril­lions of dol­lars (total­ly destroy­ing the US econ­o­my) which has made bud­get cuts nec­es­sary for every­thing, includ­ing the mil­i­tary. You know how the econ­o­mists keep talk­ing about “bub­bles”? Has this been the great­est bub­ble of all? Bor­row­ing mon­ey to blow up the mil­i­tary only to pop it when there is not enough mon­ey to sus­tain it?

    Posted by Shibusa | August 13, 2013, 11:42 am
  2. I came across this on the inter­net regard­ing Karp

    http://thepatriotperspective.wordpress.com/2012/07/29/why-the-pentagon-should-be-suspicious-of-palantir/

    It was an unlike­ly match. Before join­ing Palan­tir, Karp had spent years study­ing in Ger­many under Jür­gen Haber­mas, the most promi­nent liv­ing rep­re­sen­ta­tive of the Frank­furt School, the group of neo-Marx­ist philoso­phers and soci­ol­o­gists. After get­ting a PhD in phi­los­o­phy from the Uni­ver­si­ty of Frankfurt—he also has a degree from Stan­ford Law School—Karp drift­ed from acad­e­mia and dab­bled in stocks. He proved so good at it that, with the back­ing of a hand­ful of Euro­pean bil­lion­aires, he set up a mon­ey man­age­ment firm called the Caed­mon Group. His intel­lect, and abil­i­ty to solve a Rubik’s Cube in under a minute, com­mands an awed rev­er­ence around the Palan­tir offices, where he’s known as Dr. Karp.

    …
    Palantir’s name refers to the “see­ing stones” in Lord of the Rings that pro­vide a win­dow into oth­er parts of Mid­dle-earth. They’re mag­i­cal tools cre­at­ed by elves that can serve both good and evil. Bad wiz­ards use them to keep in touch with the over­lord in Mor­dor; good wiz­ards can peer into them to check up on the peace­ful, inno­cent Hob­bits of the Shire. As Karp explains with a straight face, his company’s grand, patri­ot­ic mis­sion is to “pro­tect the Shire.”
    This is a prob­lem. This is sta­tism in cute terms. This is a neo-Marx­ist who believes in the suprema­cy of the state, imme­di­ate­ly get­ting in tight with the state, in order to “exe­cute against the world’s most impor­tant prob­lems”. Wan­na bet his def­i­n­i­tion and yours as a free cit­i­zen dis­agree?
    The anal­o­gy and their name is apt. The palan­tir was used for evil. A palan­tir out­right used by a tyrant is easy to see as evil. A palan­tir used for spy­ing on hob­bits “to check up on inno­cent Hob­bits” invades their pri­va­cy and is just anoth­er appa­ra­tus of the tyrant. So what hap­pens if the hob­bits don’t want to be spied on?

    …

    The secre­tive data-analy­sis start­up, based in Palo Alto, Calif. and backed by ear­ly Face­book investor Peter Thiel, has suf­fered a num­ber of blows to its pub­lic image of late. The most recent is the set­tle­ment of a law­suit filed by rival i2 Group, based in McLean, Va., over accu­sa­tions that Palan­tir employ­ees fraud­u­lent­ly obtained i2 soft­ware and used it to design com­pet­ing prod­ucts.
    Since Palan­tir touts itself as the prod­uct of fraud-detec­tion tech­nolo­gies pio­neered at Pay­Pal, the pay­ments start­up Thiel cofound­ed, those charges present ironies, as i2’s lawyers eager­ly point­ed out in their ini­tial com­plaint.
    Sep­a­rate­ly, Palan­tir CEO Alex Karp issued a pub­lic state­ment apol­o­giz­ing for his company’s role in prepar­ing a plan for Bank of Amer­i­ca to strike back at Wik­ileaks, the Inter­net-based non­prof­it group famed for obtain­ing and releas­ing sen­si­tive doc­u­ments into the pub­lic domain. The com­pa­ny also placed employ­ee Matthew Steck­man on leave after hack­ers released emails show­ing he was involved in prepar­ing a sim­i­lar plan for the U.S. Cham­ber of Com­merce to dam­age ThinkProgress, a pro-labor pub­li­ca­tion.
    Isn’t that pecu­liar. Are they play­ing to their audi­ence of sta­tists, or are they dam­ag­ing rivals, or what exact­ly are they doing? Wik­ileaks and ThinkProgress

    Posted by TBd | August 14, 2013, 11:22 am
  3. the NSA has been direct­ing the eco­nom­ic course of the tech indus­try accord­ing to arti­cle from the Con­nec­tion neww­pa­per in san­ta cruz, last month.
    when i worked in this indus­try, it was known the intel put unique id # on each com­put­er to match the trap­door in msdos from microsoft.
    a french intel report 1999 states:
    “it would seem that the cre­ation of microsoft was large­ly sup­port­ed, not least finan­cial­ly, by the NSA, and that IBM was made to accept the MSDOS oper­at­ing sys­tem” ...“insis­tent rumors about the exis­tence of spy pro­grams on microsoft and by the pres­ence of NSA per­son­nel”

    multi­bil­lion­aire gates, rich­est man in amer­i­ca, is a clos­et spook with a trap­door into every life, before experts talked about it.
    “inside the code were 2 labels for keys, one was called NSAKEY”
    its pos­si­ble, we been hosed, 60 yrs of mkul­tra brain-min­ing and still we are too 911 shocked to stop it.

    Posted by kelley | August 20, 2013, 8:26 am
  4. WTF?

    Edward Snow­den, Glenn Green­wald Chal­lenge Inde­pen­dent Sto­ry

    The Huff­in­g­ton Post | By Jack Mirkin­son
    Post­ed: 08/23/2013 8:07 am EDT | Updat­ed: 08/23/2013 11:01 am EDT

    NSA leak­er Edward Snow­den accused the British gov­ern­ment on Fri­day of leak­ing sen­si­tive mate­r­i­al to a news­pa­per he’d nev­er worked with, the Inde­pen­dent, and attribut­ing the mate­r­i­al to him — a charge the paper heat­ed­ly denied.

    The paper pub­lished an exclu­sive sto­ry about a secret British spy base in the Mid­dle East on the front of its Fri­day edi­tion. The sto­ry’s pres­ence there came as a sur­prise to media-watch­ers. Snow­den has only been known to have giv­en his mate­r­i­al to a hand­ful of jour­nal­ists and out­lets. The Inde­pen­dent isn’t one of them.

    The paper said that infor­ma­tion about the base was “con­tained in the leaked doc­u­ments” from Snow­den, but that the Guardian had “agreed to the Gov­ern­men­t’s request not to pub­lish any mate­r­i­al con­tained in the Snow­den doc­u­ments that could dam­age nation­al secu­ri­ty” and “agreed to restrict the news­pa­per’s report­ing of the doc­u­ments.”

    This led some observers to won­der whether the Guardian had passed mate­r­i­al to the Inde­pen­dent because it was being cen­sored by the gov­ern­ment.

    But the Guardian’s Glenn Green­wald, who has cov­ered many of the Snow­den-based scoops for the paper, wrote on Fri­day morn­ing that he was “not aware of, nor sub­ject to, any agree­ment that impos­es any lim­i­ta­tions of any kind on the report­ing that I am doing on these doc­u­ments.”

    He also pub­lished a state­ment from Snow­den say­ing that he had “nev­er spo­ken with, worked with, or pro­vid­ed any jour­nal­is­tic mate­ri­als to the Inde­pen­dent.”

    Snow­den said he thought the British were “seek­ing to cre­ate an appear­ance that the Guardian and Wash­ing­ton Post’s dis­clo­sures are harm­ful, and they are doing so by inten­tion­al­ly leak­ing harm­ful infor­ma­tion to The Inde­pen­dent and attribut­ing it to oth­ers.”

    In response, Oliv­er Wright, an edi­tor at the Inde­pen­dent, fired back in a state­ment sent to Huff­Post UK’s Jes­si­ca Elgot:

    “These alle­ga­tions are com­plete­ly untrue. The Inde­pen­dent was not leaked the sto­ry by the gov­ern­ment or duped into pub­lish­ing it by any­one. The lead byline is that of the high­ly respect­ed free­lance jour­nal­ist Dun­can Camp­bell, who has a 25 year track record of inves­ti­gat­ing state sur­veil­lance.

    Mr. Green­wald did not con­tact The Inde­pen­dent before pub­lish­ing his blog and does not appear to have any evi­dence to back up his asser­tions. He is now ask­ing that we pro­vide infor­ma­tion about our sources for the sto­ry which, as jour­nal­ist him­self, he should realise that we will not do.”

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | August 23, 2013, 1:33 pm
  5. There was a fas­ci­nat­ing Reuters piece about one of those loom­ing poten­tial­ly world-change events that could be com­ing any year now. Or maybe already arrived, very qui­et­ly. That was would “Q‑day”, the day quan­tum code­break­ing allows for the break­ing of all of the encrypt­ed data human­i­ty has ever gen­er­at­ed. Or, almost all of it.

    As we’ve seen, experts have been pre­dict­ing “Q‑day” might not arrive until the 2030s. But that does­n’t mean it can’t come soon­er. That was the warn­ing recent­ly deliv­ered to the US Depart­ment of Defense by Tilo Kunz, exec­u­tive vice pres­i­dent of Cana­di­an cyber­se­cu­ri­ty firm Quan­tum Defen5e (QD5). Accord­ing to Kunz, “Q‑day” could be year as soon as 2025. And that’s assum­ing it’s not qui­et­ly already here.

    But Kunz was­n’t just warn­ing about an even­tu­al­ly that might arrive soon­er rather than lat­er. As Kunz described, we should already be con­cerned about the integri­ty and secu­ri­ty of today’s encrypt­ed data, whether or not “Q‑day” has been achieved yet. That’s because the day of “har­vest now, decrypt lat­er” is already here. Because don’t for­get what “Q‑day” rep­re­sents: the abil­i­ty to break almost any encryp­tion algo­rithm ever devel­oped. Mean­ing data col­lect­ed, today, last week, last year, or 50 years ago that could pre­vi­ous­ly be decrypt­ed will now be read­able. With incred­i­ble secu­ri­ty impli­ca­tions for every­one.

    This “har­vest now, decrypt lat­er” sce­nario isn’t a hypo­thet­i­cal. As Kunz also remind­ed jthe DOD, one of the great­est code break­ing feats in his­to­ry was as “har­vest now, decrypt lat­er” event: the Venona project. A 37 year efforts start­ed in 1943 that even­tu­al­ly allowed for the decryp­tion of thou­sands of Sovi­et intel­li­gence sent between 1940 and 1948. Recall how rightwing fig­ures have been using the Venona Papers to ahis­tor­i­cal­ly argue that “Joe McCarthy was right!” even though the papers are filled with evi­dence of the oppo­site.

    Notably, the key insight that led to the break­ing of the Sovi­ets’ codes was the real­iza­tion that the Sovi­ets had been mis­us­ing so-called one-time pads. This poten­tial­ly very-low-tech approach to encryp­tion also hap­pens to be one of the known the­o­ret­i­cal­ly unbreak­able meth­ods of encryp­tion still left. But there are a num­ber of lim­i­ta­tions to one-time pads includ­ing the fact that they must nev­er be reused and must be kept com­plete­ly secret to every­one but the com­mu­ni­cat­ing par­ties. Logis­ti­cal­ly, one-time pads are logis­ti­cal­ly dif­fi­cult to imple­ment, hence the Venona papers.

    Nor are clas­sic one-time pads usable for the inter­net. Instead, almost all com­mu­ni­ca­tions today over mod­ern com­mu­ni­ca­tion net­works are secured with a far more break­able form of encrypt: pub­lic key infra­struc­ture (PKI), which was devel­oped in the 1970s for encryp­tion on a mass scale. And while PKI has been high­ly suc­cess­ful at deliv­er­ing encryp­tion to the mass­es that can’t be read­i­ly hacked using today’s tech­nol­o­gy, it came at an enor­mous cost. The kind of enor­mous cast that we have yet to pay. But the bill is com­ing. Poten­tial­ly much soon­er than almost any­one expects.

    QD4 claims to have devel­oped an advanced ver­sion of the one-time pad called the Q PAD, which it claims cus­tomers can use to con­duct com­mu­ni­ca­tions on exist­ing net­works that will remain uncrack­able for­ev­er. Inter­est­ing­ly, the Q PAD also rely on quan­tum physics to accom­plish this at a mass scale by uti­liz­ing spe­cial quan­tum ran­dom num­ber gen­er­a­tor chips and hard­ware that use quan­tum physics to gen­er­ate tru­ly ran­dom num­bers. True ran­dom­iza­tion is one of the cri­te­ria for the one-time pad to pro­vide unbreak­able secu­ri­ty.

    So is the US gov­ern­ment plan­ning on turn­ing to Q PAD tech­nol­o­gy for the US’s most sen­si­tive com­mu­ni­ca­tions going for­ward? Maybe, but it sounds like the US gov­ern­ment already has a dif­fer­ent approach in mind. Last year, the US Nation­al Insti­tute of Stan­dards and Tech­nol­o­gy (NIST) chose four post-quan­tum cryp­tog­ra­phy (PQC) algo­rithms, which some cyber experts believe will pro­vide long-term secu­ri­ty. The catch is that only some cyber experts agree with this. As we’ll see, oth­ers aren’t so sure and sus­pect even today’s clas­si­cal non-quan­tum com­put­ers might be capa­ble of break­ing these algo­rithms.

    Keep in mind a major dif­fer­ence between the Q PAD approach and these four new NIST-approved algo­rithms: the Q PAD is a phys­i­cal device. These algo­rithms are just algo­rithms. No new hard­ware required. So could it be that the NIST’s ‘post-quan­tum’ algo­rithms real­ly can with­stand the brute force of a quan­tum com­put­er attack? Let’s hope so, but it’s kind of hard to see how we can be assured with­out the exis­tence of code­break­ing quan­tum com­put­ers. And it does­n’t help that some experts are claim­ing these algo­rithms aren’t even ‘pre-quan­tum’ secure.

    Beyond quan­tum com­put­ing, or quan­tum ran­dom num­ber gen­er­at­ing chips, there’s anoth­er appli­ca­tion of quan­tum physics that’s already being devel­oped that could enable a kind of post-quan­tum com­mu­ni­ca­tion secu­ri­ty: quan­tum net­works. In par­tic­u­lar, quan­tum net­works that could be used to secure­ly pass encryp­tion keys. Chi­na has already devel­oped a quan­tum net­work con­nect­ing the cities Bei­jing, Jinan, Shang­hai and Hefei. Of course, Chi­na isn’t alone in this research. Recall how the US gov­ern­men­t’s Los Alam­os lab revealed back in 2013 that it had been oper­at­ing a quan­tum inter­net for over two years, allow­ing for the quan­tum dis­sem­i­na­tion of “one-time pads” over this net­work.

    That’s the range of quan­tum-relat­ed devel­op­ments cov­ered in this fas­ci­nat­ing Reuters piece. It’s the kind of update that warns of a strate­gi­cal­ly vital quan­tum race just around the cor­ner, but hints at a race that isn’t just already under­way but poten­tial­ly secret­ly already won. Because, again, there’s no incen­tive to reveal a quan­tum code­break­ing break­through. Quite the oppo­site. It might be a “har­vest now, decrypt lat­er” sta­tus quo. But it could already be “har­vest now, qui­et­ly decrypt now”. Either way, it’s a mat­ter of when, not if:

    Reuters

    U.S. and Chi­na race to shield secrets from quan­tum com­put­ers

    The encryp­tion guard­ing dig­i­tal com­mu­ni­ca­tions could some­day be cracked by quan­tum com­put­ers. Dubbed ‘Q‑day,’ that moment could upend mil­i­tary and eco­nom­ic secu­ri­ty world­wide. Great pow­ers are sprint­ing to get there first.

    By DAVID LAGUE

    Filed Dec. 14, 2023, noon GMT

    In Feb­ru­ary, a Cana­di­an cyber­se­cu­ri­ty firm deliv­ered an omi­nous fore­cast to the U.S. Depart­ment of Defense. America’s secrets – actu­al­ly, everybody’s secrets – are now at risk of expo­sure, warned the team from Quan­tum Defen5e (QD5).

    QD5’s exec­u­tive vice pres­i­dent, Tilo Kunz, told offi­cials from the Defense Infor­ma­tion Sys­tems Agency that pos­si­bly as soon as 2025, the world would arrive at what has been dubbed “Q‑day,” the day when quan­tum com­put­ers make cur­rent encryp­tion meth­ods use­less. Machines vast­ly more pow­er­ful than today’s fastest super­com­put­ers would be capa­ble of crack­ing the codes that pro­tect vir­tu­al­ly all mod­ern com­mu­ni­ca­tion, he told the agency, which is tasked with safe­guard­ing the U.S. military’s com­mu­ni­ca­tions.

    In the mean­time, Kunz told the pan­el, a glob­al effort to plun­der data is under­way so that inter­cept­ed mes­sages can be decod­ed after Q‑day in what he described as “har­vest now, decrypt lat­er” attacks, accord­ing to a record­ing of the ses­sion the agency lat­er made pub­lic.

    Mil­i­taries would see their long-term plans and intel­li­gence gath­er­ing exposed to ene­mies. Busi­ness­es could have their intel­lec­tu­al prop­er­ty swiped. People’s health records would be laid bare.

    “We are not the only ones who are har­vest­ing, we are not the only ones hop­ing to decrypt that in the future,” Kunz said, with­out nam­ing names. “Every­thing that gets sent over pub­lic net­works is at risk.”

    Kunz is among a grow­ing cho­rus sound­ing this alarm. Many cyber experts believe all the major pow­ers are col­lect­ing ahead of Q‑day. The Unit­ed States and Chi­na, the world’s lead­ing mil­i­tary pow­ers, are accus­ing each oth­er of data har­vest­ing on a grand scale.

    The direc­tor of the Fed­er­al Bureau of Inves­ti­ga­tion, Christo­pher Wray, said in Sep­tem­ber that Chi­na had “a big­ger hack­ing pro­gram than every oth­er major nation com­bined.” In a Sep­tem­ber report, China’s chief civil­ian intel­li­gence agency, the Min­istry of State Secu­ri­ty, accused the U.S. Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Agency of “sys­tem­at­ic” attacks to steal Chi­nese data.

    ...

    More is at stake than crack­ing codes. Quan­tum com­put­ers, which har­ness the mys­te­ri­ous prop­er­ties of sub­atom­ic par­ti­cles, promise to deliv­er break­throughs in sci­ence, arma­ments and indus­try, researchers say. (See relat­ed sto­ry.)

    Opin­ion is divid­ed on the expect­ed arrival of Q‑day, to be sure. It’s still rel­a­tive­ly ear­ly days for quan­tum com­put­ing: So far, only small quan­tum com­put­ers with lim­it­ed pro­cess­ing pow­er and a vul­ner­a­bil­i­ty to error have been built. Some researchers esti­mate that Q‑day might come clos­er to the mid­dle of the cen­tu­ry.

    No one knows who might get there first. The Unit­ed States and Chi­na are con­sid­ered the lead­ers in the field; many experts believe Amer­i­ca still holds an edge.

    As the race to mas­ter quan­tum com­put­ing con­tin­ues, a scram­ble is on to pro­tect crit­i­cal data. Wash­ing­ton and its allies are work­ing on new encryp­tion stan­dards known as post-quan­tum cryp­tog­ra­phy – essen­tial­ly codes that are much hard­er to crack, even for a quan­tum com­put­er. Bei­jing is try­ing to pio­neer quan­tum com­mu­ni­ca­tions net­works, a tech­nol­o­gy the­o­ret­i­cal­ly impos­si­ble to hack, accord­ing to researchers. The sci­en­tist spear­head­ing Beijing’s efforts has become a minor celebri­ty in Chi­na.

    Quan­tum com­put­ing is rad­i­cal­ly dif­fer­ent. Con­ven­tion­al com­put­ers process infor­ma­tion as bits – either 1 or 0, and just one num­ber at a time. Quan­tum com­put­ers process in quan­tum bits, or “qubits,” which can be 1, 0 or any num­ber in between, all at the same time, which physi­cists say is an approx­i­mate way of describ­ing a com­plex math­e­mat­i­cal con­cept.

    These com­put­ers also exploit a mys­te­ri­ous prop­er­ty of quan­tum mechan­ics known as entan­gle­ment. Par­ti­cles such as pho­tons or elec­trons can become entan­gled so that they remain con­nect­ed, even when sep­a­rat­ed by huge dis­tances. Changes in one par­ti­cle are imme­di­ate­ly reflect­ed in the oth­er. The prop­er­ties of qubits and entan­gle­ment are fun­da­men­tal to quan­tum com­put­ers, say physi­cists and com­put­er sci­en­tists, poten­tial­ly allow­ing cal­cu­la­tions to be car­ried out that would be imprac­ti­cal on today’s large super­com­put­ers.

    Busi­ness con­sul­tants fore­cast this pro­cess­ing pow­er will deliv­er hun­dreds of bil­lions of dol­lars in extra rev­enue by the mid­dle of the next decade. Even before these com­put­ers arrive, some are pre­dict­ing that advances in quan­tum tech­nol­o­gy will sharply improve the per­for­mance of some mil­i­tary hard­ware.

    Quan­tum tech­nol­o­gy “is like­ly to be as trans­for­ma­tion­al in the 21st cen­tu­ry as har­ness­ing elec­tric­i­ty as a resource was in the 19th cen­tu­ry,” said Michael Bier­cuk, founder and chief exec­u­tive offi­cer of Q‑CTRL, a quan­tum tech com­pa­ny that was estab­lished in Aus­tralia and has major oper­a­tions in the Unit­ed States.

    Crack­ing codes

    It was the code­break­ing pos­si­bil­i­ties of quan­tum com­put­ing that sparked the field’s surge in progress in recent decades, said Q‑CTRL’s Bier­cuk, an Amer­i­can who is a pro­fes­sor of quan­tum physics at the Uni­ver­si­ty of Syd­ney and a for­mer con­sul­tant to the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Pentagon’s inno­va­tion incu­ba­tor. The U.S. gov­ern­ment saw it as a “big oppor­tu­ni­ty ” in the 1990s and has been fund­ing research ever since, he said.

    In his brief­ing for the Pen­ta­gon, QD5’s Kunz cit­ed what he called one of the most suc­cess­ful har­vest now/decrypt lat­er oper­a­tions ever: the Venona project.

    Launched in 1943, Venona was a 37-year U.S. effort to deci­pher Sovi­et diplo­mat­ic com­mu­ni­ca­tions col­lect­ed by the Amer­i­cans dur­ing and after World War Two. U.S. code­break­ers, aid­ed by allies, were able to decrypt more than 2,900 cables from thou­sands of mes­sages sent by Sovi­et intel­li­gence agen­cies between 1940 and 1948, accord­ing to CIA doc­u­ments.

    The cables revealed exten­sive Com­mu­nist intel­li­gence oper­a­tions against the Unit­ed States and its allies. The code-crack­ing coup led to the dis­cov­ery of Sovi­et pen­e­tra­tion of the Man­hat­tan Project, the top-secret pro­gram to build the first atom­ic bombs, and the exis­tence of the Cam­bridge Five, a group of top British civ­il ser­vants spy­ing for Moscow, the CIA doc­u­ments show.

    The West’s break­through was the real­iza­tion that the Sovi­ets had mis­used so-called one-time pads: a time-test­ed form of encryp­tion in which a secret key is used to encode a mes­sage sent between par­ties. The method got its name because in its ear­li­est forms, keys were print­ed on a pad whose pages each con­tained a unique code; the top page was ripped off and destroyed after a sin­gle use. The Sovi­ets blun­dered by print­ing and using dupli­cate pages in one-time pads for a lim­it­ed time. This allowed allied ana­lysts to painstak­ing­ly decrypt some of the mes­sages years lat­er, accord­ing to the CIA doc­u­ments.

    To be tru­ly unbreak­able, cyber­se­cu­ri­ty experts say, a one-time-pad key must be a set of ran­dom num­bers equal to or big­ger than the size of the mes­sage – and used only once. The par­ty receiv­ing the mes­sage uses the same secret key to decrypt the mes­sage. The method was invent­ed more than a cen­tu­ry ago, and for decades was used for secret mes­sages by most major pow­ers. But tech­ni­cal fac­tors made it too unwieldy for mass, secure com­mu­ni­ca­tion in the mod­ern era.

    Instead, most com­mu­ni­ca­tions today are secured with what is known as pub­lic key infra­struc­ture (PKI), a sys­tem devel­oped in the 1970s to enable encryp­tion on a mass scale.

    PKI enabled the rise of the inter­net econ­o­my and open telecom­mu­ni­ca­tions sys­tems. The pass­words to email accounts, online bank­ing and secure mes­sag­ing plat­forms all rely on it. PKI is also crit­i­cal to most gov­ern­ment and nation­al secu­ri­ty com­mu­ni­ca­tions.

    Secu­ri­ty pro­vid­ed by PKI stems essen­tial­ly from hid­ing infor­ma­tion behind a very dif­fi­cult math prob­lem, Bier­cuk said. The most wide­ly used algo­rithm that cre­ates and man­ages that dif­fi­cult math prob­lem used for encryp­tion is known as RSA, from the sur­name ini­tials of its inven­tors: the com­put­er sci­en­tists and cryp­tog­ra­phers Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adel­man. What may be about to change is that these prob­lems will be a cinch for quan­tum com­put­ers to solve.

    “If you have a com­put­er for which that math prob­lem is not very hard,” Bier­cuk said, “all of that is at risk.”

    Mon­tre­al-based QD5, the pri­vate­ly held com­pa­ny where Kunz is exec­u­tive vice pres­i­dent, is tak­ing a dif­fer­ent approach to post-quan­tum cryp­tog­ra­phy. It has devel­oped an advanced ver­sion of the one-time pad: a device, the Q PAD, which it claims cus­tomers can use to con­duct com­mu­ni­ca­tions on exist­ing net­works that will remain uncrack­able for­ev­er. Pen­ta­gon offi­cials pep­pered Kunz and col­leagues with tech­ni­cal ques­tions about the tech­nol­o­gy in Feb­ru­ary, but not­ed the infor­ma­tion­al ses­sion didn’t nec­es­sar­i­ly sig­nal an intent to buy the Q PAD sys­tem.

    ...

    In an inter­view, Kunz, a for­mer Cana­di­an sol­dier, said he first learned about one-time pads while serv­ing with a recon­nais­sance unit.

    “It is very sim­ple and straight­for­ward,” he said. “Every time you used one of those sheets of paper, you would have to destroy it. If you only have those two keys, and fol­low the rules,” a mes­sage may be inter­cept­ed, but the ene­my “will nev­er be able to break it.”

    QD5 has over­come some of the lim­i­ta­tions of the orig­i­nal one-time pad, said Chief Tech­nol­o­gy Offi­cer Gary Swat­ton. One hur­dle to mass use of the method was the need to gen­er­ate enough sets of tru­ly ran­dom num­bers to sup­ply mod­ern com­mu­ni­ca­tions net­works with encryp­tion. Before quan­tum tech­nolo­gies emerged, this took con­sid­er­able time and effort.

    Now, spe­cial­ly designed semi­con­duc­tor chips and hard­ware, called quan­tum ran­dom num­ber gen­er­a­tors, can exploit the tru­ly ran­dom nature of sub­atom­ic quan­tum par­ti­cles to gen­er­ate num­ber sets in large vol­umes, accord­ing to researchers. “Tech­nol­o­gy has caught up and is solv­ing these prob­lems,” Swat­ton said.

    Oth­er com­pa­nies hope to seize on demand for bet­ter secu­ri­ty. Sand­box­AQ of Tar­ry­town, New York, a spin-off from Google own­er Alpha­bet, has a divi­sion to help clients tack­le the threat from quan­tum com­put­ing and lever­age the ben­e­fits of this pow­er­ful tech­nol­o­gy. Even if Q‑day is a decade or more away, “it’s imper­a­tive that orga­ni­za­tions begin prepar­ing for the migra­tion to post-quan­tum cryp­tog­ra­phy now,” said Marc Man­zano, SandboxAQ’s gen­er­al man­ag­er of quan­tum secu­ri­ty.

    Some antic­i­pate upheaval. Skip Sanz­eri, founder and chief oper­at­ing offi­cer of quan­tum secu­ri­ty com­pa­ny QuSe­cure in San Mateo, Cal­i­for­nia, says “the entire inter­net and the devices con­nect­ed to it” will be affect­ed. The World Eco­nom­ic Forum has esti­mat­ed that 20 bil­lion devices will have to be upgrad­ed or replaced to meet quan­tum secu­ri­ty stan­dards in the next two decades.

    “This is going to be a $100 bil­lion or tril­lion-dol­lar upgrade,” Sanz­eri says.

    While quan­tum com­put­ing threat­ens to upend exist­ing secu­ri­ty mea­sures, the physics behind this tech­nol­o­gy could also be exploit­ed to build the­o­ret­i­cal­ly unhack­able net­works.

    In a quan­tum com­mu­ni­ca­tions net­work, users exchange a secret key or code on sub­atom­ic par­ti­cles called pho­tons, allow­ing them to encrypt and decrypt data. This is called quan­tum key dis­tri­b­u­tion, or QKD. It is one of the fun­da­men­tal prop­er­ties of quan­tum mechan­ics that can ensure secure com­mu­ni­ca­tions. Any attempt to mon­i­tor or inter­fere with these quan­tum par­ti­cles changes them, physi­cists explain. That means any attempt to inter­cept the com­mu­ni­ca­tions is imme­di­ate­ly detectable to users. If the com­mu­ni­cat­ing par­ties receive an uncor­rupt­ed encryp­tion key, they can be con­fi­dent that their sub­se­quent com­mu­ni­ca­tions will be secure.

    With quan­tum net­works, “our tech­ni­cal secu­ri­ty comes from the laws of physics,” says physi­cist Gre­goire Ribor­dy, chief exec­u­tive offi­cer of ID Quan­tique (IDQ), a pri­vate­ly held Swiss com­pa­ny that pro­vides quan­tum com­mu­ni­ca­tions tech­nol­o­gy. “Inter­cep­tion of the com­mu­ni­ca­tions is just not pos­si­ble with­out leav­ing a trace.”

    China’s big bet

    Quan­tum com­mu­ni­ca­tions is an area where Chi­na is spend­ing big. The tech­nol­o­gy has the poten­tial to safe­guard Beijing’s data net­works, even if Wash­ing­ton and oth­er rivals are first to reach Q‑day.

    Pres­i­dent Xi Jin­ping stressed the “strate­gic val­ue” of quan­tum tech­nol­o­gy in a 2020 speech to top Chi­nese lead­ers, the offi­cial Xin­hua news agency report­ed. Under Xi, Chi­na has set clear tar­gets to dom­i­nate quan­tum sci­ence. It is spend­ing more than any oth­er coun­try on quan­tum research by some esti­mates. In an April report, McK­in­sey & Com­pa­ny esti­mat­ed that Bei­jing had announced a cumu­la­tive $15.3 bil­lion in fund­ing for quan­tum research, more than quadru­ple the equiv­a­lent U.S. fig­ure of $3.7 bil­lion.

    A key dri­ver of China’s quan­tum tech quest is Pan Jian­wei, a physi­cist who has achieved celebri­ty sta­tus in Chi­na along with praise and sup­port from the rul­ing Com­mu­nist Par­ty.

    Pan, 53, is a pro­fes­sor at the Uni­ver­si­ty of Sci­ence and Tech­nol­o­gy of Chi­na, the country’s pre­mier quan­tum research out­fit. In 2011, he was elect­ed to the Chi­nese Acad­e­my of Sci­ences, an hon­or giv­en to sci­en­tists who have made impor­tant advances in their fields.

    Pan in media inter­views has said he wants to make Chi­na a leader in quan­tum tech­nol­o­gy while build­ing an inter­net secure from cyber­at­tacks. This would serve vital strate­gic pur­pos­es, secu­ri­ty experts say. It would pro­tect the Chi­nese lead­er­ship and mil­i­tary from hack­ing, espe­cial­ly in a con­flict. A quan­tum-for­ti­fied inter­net could pro­tect vital infra­struc­ture and the vast sur­veil­lance net­work the Com­mu­nist Par­ty has built to stamp out any chal­lenge to its monop­oly on pow­er, they say.

    ...

    Pan’s career high­lights how the absorp­tion of for­eign tech­nol­o­gy has been cru­cial to Chi­na in quan­tum and oth­er tech fields.

    He stud­ied for his doc­tor­ate in Vien­na with renowned physi­cist Anton Zeilinger. Zeilinger shared the 2022 Nobel Prize in Physics for his work on quan­tum mechan­ics. Pan lat­er moved to the Uni­ver­si­ty of Hei­del­berg, where he still main­tains close links, before return­ing home in 2008.

    ...

    Back in Chi­na, Pan led a team that record­ed a mile­stone in 2016 with the launch of Micius, the world’s first quan­tum satel­lite, which was used to estab­lish secure com­mu­ni­ca­tions links with ground sta­tions in Chi­na.

    The fol­low­ing year, his team and researchers in Aus­tria used Micius to hold the world’s first quan­tum-encrypt­ed tele­con­fer­ence, con­nect­ing Bei­jing and Vien­na. Pan also led a team that has report­ed­ly built a sim­i­lar­ly unhack­able ground-based net­work in Chi­na link­ing the cities of Bei­jing, Jinan, Shang­hai and Hefei.

    Pan was one of the archi­tects of a con­cert­ed cam­paign to deploy Chi­nese sci­en­tists to lead­ing quan­tum labs around the world, with the goal of jump-start­ing domes­tic devel­op­ment when these researchers returned home, accord­ing to a 2019 report by Strid­er Tech­nolo­gies, a Salt Lake City-based strate­gic intel­li­gence start­up.

    Some of those researchers, includ­ing Pan, ben­e­fit­ed from sub­stan­tial for­eign gov­ern­ment fund­ing while study­ing abroad, the report found. “From that regard it has been wild­ly suc­cess­ful,” Strid­er Tech­nolo­gies Chief Exec­u­tive Offi­cer Greg Levesque said of the Chi­nese strat­e­gy in an inter­view with Reuters. “But I don’t know if they are going to win it,” he added. “It seems some U.S. com­pa­nies are mak­ing some real­ly big leaps.”

    Despite China’s appar­ent lead in offi­cial fund­ing, some researchers say Amer­i­ca remains the over­all quan­tum leader thanks to its pri­vate sec­tor tech­nol­o­gy inno­va­tors, gov­ern­ment labs, uni­ver­si­ty researchers and col­lab­o­rat­ing allies. And Wash­ing­ton is mov­ing to restrict U.S. invest­ment in China’s quan­tum capa­bil­i­ties.

    In August, Pres­i­dent Joe Biden signed an exec­u­tive order direct­ing the U.S. Depart­ment of the Trea­sury to reg­u­late U.S. invest­ments in quan­tum com­put­ing, semi­con­duc­tors and arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence. An annex to that order named Chi­na as a coun­try of con­cern, along with its spe­cial admin­is­tra­tive regions of Hong Kong and Macau. That could lead to bans on invest­ment in Chi­nese pro­duc­tion of quan­tum tech­nolo­gies and equip­ment.

    ...

    New secu­ri­ty era

    Glob­al­ly, gov­ern­ment secu­ri­ty agen­cies and the pri­vate sec­tor are work­ing on strate­gies to beat quan­tum com­put­ers. In August, the U.S. Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Agency and oth­er agen­cies urged the pub­lic and com­pa­nies to adopt new mea­sures to safe­guard their com­mu­ni­ca­tions with post-quan­tum cryp­tog­ra­phy.

    After exten­sive eval­u­a­tion, the U.S. Nation­al Insti­tute of Stan­dards and Tech­nol­o­gy (NIST) last year select­ed four so-called post-quan­tum cryp­tog­ra­phy (PQC) algo­rithms – new encryp­tion stan­dards that some cyber experts believe will pro­vide long-term secu­ri­ty. U.S. gov­ern­ment agen­cies next year are expect­ed to issue a new stan­dard for post-quan­tum cryp­tog­ra­phy, Biden dis­closed in a May memo. NIST said in August that it’s work­ing on stan­dard­iz­ing these algo­rithms, the final step before mak­ing these tools wide­ly avail­able for orga­ni­za­tions to upgrade their encryp­tion.

    SandboxAQ’s Man­zano said his com­pa­ny is work­ing with some of the world’s biggest com­pa­nies and gov­ern­ment agen­cies to inte­grate the com­ing PQC cryp­tog­ra­phy algo­rithms into their sys­tems. Sanz­eri said QuSe­cure, too, is work­ing with gov­ern­ment and pri­vate clients to upgrade to PQC.

    Not every­one agrees the new algo­rithms will offer reli­able secu­ri­ty. Kunz told Reuters that even­tu­al­ly the new cyphers could be com­pro­mised as quan­tum com­put­ers improve. “The prob­lem is that PQC is not unbreak­able,” he said. “It does not solve the har­vest now, decrypt lat­er prob­lem.”

    IDQ’s Ribor­dy said that today’s clas­si­cal com­put­ers also might be able to crack these new codes. The com­plex math prob­lems at the heart of PQC are “so new” that they have not been stud­ied very exten­sive­ly, he not­ed.

    A spokesper­son for NIST said the agency “has con­fi­dence in the secu­ri­ty of the PQC algo­rithms select­ed for stan­dard­iza­tion, (or) else we wouldn’t be stan­dard­iz­ing them. The algo­rithms have been stud­ied by experts, and went through an inten­sive eval­u­a­tion process.” He added that it was not inevitable or even a “safe assump­tion” that they would be bro­ken.

    ...

    In the mean­time, one chal­lenge for the keep­ers of dig­i­tal secrets is that when­ev­er Q‑day comes, quan­tum code­break­ers are unlike­ly to announce their break­through. Instead, they’re like­ly to keep qui­et, so they can exploit the advan­tage as long as pos­si­ble.

    “We won’t nec­es­sar­i­ly know” when the codes are bro­ken, Kunz told the Pen­ta­gon pan­el. “We will prob­a­bly find out the hard way,” he said. “But what we can expect is that they will be bro­ken.”

    ————

    “U.S. and Chi­na race to shield secrets from quan­tum com­put­ers” By DAVID LAGUE; Reuters; 12/14/2023

    “QD5’s exec­u­tive vice pres­i­dent, Tilo Kunz, told offi­cials from the Defense Infor­ma­tion Sys­tems Agency that pos­si­bly as soon as 2025, the world would arrive at what has been dubbed “Q‑day,” the day when quan­tum com­put­ers make cur­rent encryp­tion meth­ods use­less. Machines vast­ly more pow­er­ful than today’s fastest super­com­put­ers would be capa­ble of crack­ing the codes that pro­tect vir­tu­al­ly all mod­ern com­mu­ni­ca­tion, he told the agency, which is tasked with safe­guard­ing the U.S. military’s com­mu­ni­ca­tions.”

    “Q‑day” as soon as 2025. Maybe lat­er, but maybe just lit­tle more than a year away. That was the warn­ing from Tilo Kunz, exec­u­tive vice pres­i­dent of quan­tum com­put­ing firm QD5, to US defense offi­cials. Along with the warn­ing that a “har­vest now, decrypt lat­er” race is already under­way in antic­i­pa­tion. As Kunz put it, “Every­thing that gets sent over pub­lic net­works is at risk”:

    ...
    In the mean­time, Kunz told the pan­el, a glob­al effort to plun­der data is under­way so that inter­cept­ed mes­sages can be decod­ed after Q‑day in what he described as “har­vest now, decrypt lat­er” attacks, accord­ing to a record­ing of the ses­sion the agency lat­er made pub­lic.

    Mil­i­taries would see their long-term plans and intel­li­gence gath­er­ing exposed to ene­mies. Busi­ness­es could have their intel­lec­tu­al prop­er­ty swiped. People’s health records would be laid bare.

    “We are not the only ones who are har­vest­ing, we are not the only ones hop­ing to decrypt that in the future,” Kunz said, with­out nam­ing names. “Every­thing that gets sent over pub­lic net­works is at risk.”

    Kunz is among a grow­ing cho­rus sound­ing this alarm. Many cyber experts believe all the major pow­ers are col­lect­ing ahead of Q‑day. The Unit­ed States and Chi­na, the world’s lead­ing mil­i­tary pow­ers, are accus­ing each oth­er of data har­vest­ing on a grand scale.

    ...

    Opin­ion is divid­ed on the expect­ed arrival of Q‑day, to be sure. It’s still rel­a­tive­ly ear­ly days for quan­tum com­put­ing: So far, only small quan­tum com­put­ers with lim­it­ed pro­cess­ing pow­er and a vul­ner­a­bil­i­ty to error have been built. Some researchers esti­mate that Q‑day might come clos­er to the mid­dle of the cen­tu­ry.

    No one knows who might get there first. The Unit­ed States and Chi­na are con­sid­ered the lead­ers in the field; many experts believe Amer­i­ca still holds an edge.
    ...

    As Kunz reminds us, this isn’t a hypo­thet­i­cal. That “har­vest now, decrypt lat­er” sce­nario is what the 37-year long Venona project was all about. Decades old intel­li­gence may not be fresh, but that does­n’t mean its not invalu­able. Notably, that suc­cess with the Venona project came via the real­iza­tion that the Sovi­ets were incor­rect­ly imple­ment­ing “one-time pads”, a method of pre-quan­tum encryp­tion that, in the­o­ry, is unhack­able if done cor­rect­ly, even for quan­tum sys­tems. It’s a poten­tial­ly key piece of his­to­ry giv­en that, today, it appears that one-time pads are one of the few remain­ing options avail­able for mak­ing today’s data resis­tant to future decryp­tion. At the same time, the pub­lic key infra­struc­ture (PKI) tech­nol­o­gy that’s become stan­dard in the inter­net age is all going to be vul­ner­a­ble to this kind of “har­vest­ing”:

    ...
    In his brief­ing for the Pen­ta­gon, QD5’s Kunz cit­ed what he called one of the most suc­cess­ful har­vest now/decrypt lat­er oper­a­tions ever: the Venona project.

    Launched in 1943, Venona was a 37-year U.S. effort to deci­pher Sovi­et diplo­mat­ic com­mu­ni­ca­tions col­lect­ed by the Amer­i­cans dur­ing and after World War Two. U.S. code­break­ers, aid­ed by allies, were able to decrypt more than 2,900 cables from thou­sands of mes­sages sent by Sovi­et intel­li­gence agen­cies between 1940 and 1948, accord­ing to CIA doc­u­ments.

    The cables revealed exten­sive Com­mu­nist intel­li­gence oper­a­tions against the Unit­ed States and its allies. The code-crack­ing coup led to the dis­cov­ery of Sovi­et pen­e­tra­tion of the Man­hat­tan Project, the top-secret pro­gram to build the first atom­ic bombs, and the exis­tence of the Cam­bridge Five, a group of top British civ­il ser­vants spy­ing for Moscow, the CIA doc­u­ments show.

    The West’s break­through was the real­iza­tion that the Sovi­ets had mis­used so-called one-time pads: a time-test­ed form of encryp­tion in which a secret key is used to encode a mes­sage sent between par­ties. The method got its name because in its ear­li­est forms, keys were print­ed on a pad whose pages each con­tained a unique code; the top page was ripped off and destroyed after a sin­gle use. The Sovi­ets blun­dered by print­ing and using dupli­cate pages in one-time pads for a lim­it­ed time. This allowed allied ana­lysts to painstak­ing­ly decrypt some of the mes­sages years lat­er, accord­ing to the CIA doc­u­ments.

    To be tru­ly unbreak­able, cyber­se­cu­ri­ty experts say, a one-time-pad key must be a set of ran­dom num­bers equal to or big­ger than the size of the mes­sage – and used only once. The par­ty receiv­ing the mes­sage uses the same secret key to decrypt the mes­sage. The method was invent­ed more than a cen­tu­ry ago, and for decades was used for secret mes­sages by most major pow­ers. But tech­ni­cal fac­tors made it too unwieldy for mass, secure com­mu­ni­ca­tion in the mod­ern era.

    Instead, most com­mu­ni­ca­tions today are secured with what is known as pub­lic key infra­struc­ture (PKI), a sys­tem devel­oped in the 1970s to enable encryp­tion on a mass scale.

    PKI enabled the rise of the inter­net econ­o­my and open telecom­mu­ni­ca­tions sys­tems. The pass­words to email accounts, online bank­ing and secure mes­sag­ing plat­forms all rely on it. PKI is also crit­i­cal to most gov­ern­ment and nation­al secu­ri­ty com­mu­ni­ca­tions.

    Secu­ri­ty pro­vid­ed by PKI stems essen­tial­ly from hid­ing infor­ma­tion behind a very dif­fi­cult math prob­lem, Bier­cuk said. The most wide­ly used algo­rithm that cre­ates and man­ages that dif­fi­cult math prob­lem used for encryp­tion is known as RSA, from the sur­name ini­tials of its inven­tors: the com­put­er sci­en­tists and cryp­tog­ra­phers Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adel­man. What may be about to change is that these prob­lems will be a cinch for quan­tum com­put­ers to solve.

    “If you have a com­put­er for which that math prob­lem is not very hard,” Bier­cuk said, “all of that is at risk.”
    ...

    So we should­n’t be sur­prised to learn that Kun­z’s QD5 is devel­op­ing a new advanced ver­sion of the one-time pad for use on exist­ing non-quan­tum net­works. Inter­est­ing­ly, this advanced one-time pad tech­nol­o­gy uti­lizes quan­tum tech­nol­o­gy, but only for the gen­er­a­tion of tru­ly ran­dom num­bers, one of the one-time pad’s key require­ments:

    ...
    Mon­tre­al-based QD5, the pri­vate­ly held com­pa­ny where Kunz is exec­u­tive vice pres­i­dent, is tak­ing a dif­fer­ent approach to post-quan­tum cryp­tog­ra­phy. It has devel­oped an advanced ver­sion of the one-time pad: a device, the Q PAD, which it claims cus­tomers can use to con­duct com­mu­ni­ca­tions on exist­ing net­works that will remain uncrack­able for­ev­er. Pen­ta­gon offi­cials pep­pered Kunz and col­leagues with tech­ni­cal ques­tions about the tech­nol­o­gy in Feb­ru­ary, but not­ed the infor­ma­tion­al ses­sion didn’t nec­es­sar­i­ly sig­nal an intent to buy the Q PAD sys­tem.

    ...

    In an inter­view, Kunz, a for­mer Cana­di­an sol­dier, said he first learned about one-time pads while serv­ing with a recon­nais­sance unit.

    “It is very sim­ple and straight­for­ward,” he said. “Every time you used one of those sheets of paper, you would have to destroy it. If you only have those two keys, and fol­low the rules,” a mes­sage may be inter­cept­ed, but the ene­my “will nev­er be able to break it.”

    QD5 has over­come some of the lim­i­ta­tions of the orig­i­nal one-time pad, said Chief Tech­nol­o­gy Offi­cer Gary Swat­ton. One hur­dle to mass use of the method was the need to gen­er­ate enough sets of tru­ly ran­dom num­bers to sup­ply mod­ern com­mu­ni­ca­tions net­works with encryp­tion. Before quan­tum tech­nolo­gies emerged, this took con­sid­er­able time and effort.

    Now, spe­cial­ly designed semi­con­duc­tor chips and hard­ware, called quan­tum ran­dom num­ber gen­er­a­tors, can exploit the tru­ly ran­dom nature of sub­atom­ic quan­tum par­ti­cles to gen­er­ate num­ber sets in large vol­umes, accord­ing to researchers. “Tech­nol­o­gy has caught up and is solv­ing these prob­lems,” Swat­ton said.
    ...

    But QD5’s one-time pad tech­nol­o­gy does­n’t appear to tbe what the US gov­ern­ment is plan­ning on rely­ing on in the face of this threat. Instead, the U.S. Nation­al Insti­tute of Stan­dards and Tech­nol­o­gy (NIST) select­ed four post-quan­tum cryp­tog­ra­phy (PQC) algo­rithms intend­ed to ful­fill that role. The prob­lem is, as Kunz points out, these PQCs may not actu­al­ly be as unhack­able as claimed. The threat isn’t just from future quan­tum com­put­ers. Even clas­si­cal com­put­ers can poten­tial­ly defeat these sup­posed post-quan­tum algo­rithms. In oth­er words, the post-quan­tum algo­rithms appear to be based on dif­fi­cult math prob­lems, like PKIs, but are pre­sum­ably much more dif­fi­cult. But extreme­ly dif­fi­cult math prob­lems are still hypo­thet­i­cal­ly solv­able, unlike a one-time pad for which there is no under­ly­ing prob­lem to solve:

    ...
    As the race to mas­ter quan­tum com­put­ing con­tin­ues, a scram­ble is on to pro­tect crit­i­cal data. Wash­ing­ton and its allies are work­ing on new encryp­tion stan­dards known as post-quan­tum cryp­tog­ra­phy – essen­tial­ly codes that are much hard­er to crack, even for a quan­tum com­put­er. Bei­jing is try­ing to pio­neer quan­tum com­mu­ni­ca­tions net­works, a tech­nol­o­gy the­o­ret­i­cal­ly impos­si­ble to hack, accord­ing to researchers. The sci­en­tist spear­head­ing Beijing’s efforts has become a minor celebri­ty in Chi­na.

    ...

    Glob­al­ly, gov­ern­ment secu­ri­ty agen­cies and the pri­vate sec­tor are work­ing on strate­gies to beat quan­tum com­put­ers. In August, the U.S. Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Agency and oth­er agen­cies urged the pub­lic and com­pa­nies to adopt new mea­sures to safe­guard their com­mu­ni­ca­tions with post-quan­tum cryp­tog­ra­phy.

    After exten­sive eval­u­a­tion, the U.S. Nation­al Insti­tute of Stan­dards and Tech­nol­o­gy (NIST) last year select­ed four so-called post-quan­tum cryp­tog­ra­phy (PQC) algo­rithms – new encryp­tion stan­dards that some cyber experts believe will pro­vide long-term secu­ri­ty. U.S. gov­ern­ment agen­cies next year are expect­ed to issue a new stan­dard for post-quan­tum cryp­tog­ra­phy, Biden dis­closed in a May memo. NIST said in August that it’s work­ing on stan­dard­iz­ing these algo­rithms, the final step before mak­ing these tools wide­ly avail­able for orga­ni­za­tions to upgrade their encryp­tion.

    SandboxAQ’s Man­zano said his com­pa­ny is work­ing with some of the world’s biggest com­pa­nies and gov­ern­ment agen­cies to inte­grate the com­ing PQC cryp­tog­ra­phy algo­rithms into their sys­tems. Sanz­eri said QuSe­cure, too, is work­ing with gov­ern­ment and pri­vate clients to upgrade to PQC.

    Not every­one agrees the new algo­rithms will offer reli­able secu­ri­ty. Kunz told Reuters that even­tu­al­ly the new cyphers could be com­pro­mised as quan­tum com­put­ers improve. “The prob­lem is that PQC is not unbreak­able,” he said. “It does not solve the har­vest now, decrypt lat­er prob­lem.”

    IDQ’s Ribor­dy said that today’s clas­si­cal com­put­ers also might be able to crack these new codes. The com­plex math prob­lems at the heart of PQC are “so new” that they have not been stud­ied very exten­sive­ly, he not­ed.

    A spokesper­son for NIST said the agency “has con­fi­dence in the secu­ri­ty of the PQC algo­rithms select­ed for stan­dard­iza­tion, (or) else we wouldn’t be stan­dard­iz­ing them. The algo­rithms have been stud­ied by experts, and went through an inten­sive eval­u­a­tion process.” He added that it was not inevitable or even a “safe assump­tion” that they would be bro­ken.
    ...

    At the same time, Chi­na appears to have already suc­cess­ful­ly built its own the­o­ret­i­cal­ly unbreak­able com­mu­ni­ca­tion net­works based on quan­tum key dis­tri­b­u­tion (QKD) tech­nol­o­gy, allow­ing for the quan­tum dis­tri­b­u­tion of encryp­tion keys that can be shared with high con­fi­dence. The back­bone of such a net­work already con­nects Bei­jing, Jinan, Shang­hai and Hefei. Recall how the US gov­ern­men­t’s Los Alam­os lab revealed back in 2013 that it had been oper­at­ing a quan­tum inter­net for over two years, allow­ing for the quan­tum dis­sem­i­na­tion of “one-time pads” over this net­work. Chi­na obvi­ous­ly isn’t the only coun­try build­ing this kind of tech­nol­o­gy:

    ...
    While quan­tum com­put­ing threat­ens to upend exist­ing secu­ri­ty mea­sures, the physics behind this tech­nol­o­gy could also be exploit­ed to build the­o­ret­i­cal­ly unhack­able net­works.

    In a quan­tum com­mu­ni­ca­tions net­work, users exchange a secret key or code on sub­atom­ic par­ti­cles called pho­tons, allow­ing them to encrypt and decrypt data. This is called quan­tum key dis­tri­b­u­tion, or QKD. It is one of the fun­da­men­tal prop­er­ties of quan­tum mechan­ics that can ensure secure com­mu­ni­ca­tions. Any attempt to mon­i­tor or inter­fere with these quan­tum par­ti­cles changes them, physi­cists explain. That means any attempt to inter­cept the com­mu­ni­ca­tions is imme­di­ate­ly detectable to users. If the com­mu­ni­cat­ing par­ties receive an uncor­rupt­ed encryp­tion key, they can be con­fi­dent that their sub­se­quent com­mu­ni­ca­tions will be secure.

    With quan­tum net­works, “our tech­ni­cal secu­ri­ty comes from the laws of physics,” says physi­cist Gre­goire Ribor­dy, chief exec­u­tive offi­cer of ID Quan­tique (IDQ), a pri­vate­ly held Swiss com­pa­ny that pro­vides quan­tum com­mu­ni­ca­tions tech­nol­o­gy. “Inter­cep­tion of the com­mu­ni­ca­tions is just not pos­si­ble with­out leav­ing a trace.”

    ...

    Back in Chi­na, Pan led a team that record­ed a mile­stone in 2016 with the launch of Micius, the world’s first quan­tum satel­lite, which was used to estab­lish secure com­mu­ni­ca­tions links with ground sta­tions in Chi­na.

    The fol­low­ing year, his team and researchers in Aus­tria used Micius to hold the world’s first quan­tum-encrypt­ed tele­con­fer­ence, con­nect­ing Bei­jing and Vien­na. Pan also led a team that has report­ed­ly built a sim­i­lar­ly unhack­able ground-based net­work in Chi­na link­ing the cities of Bei­jing, Jinan, Shang­hai and Hefei.

    Pan was one of the archi­tects of a con­cert­ed cam­paign to deploy Chi­nese sci­en­tists to lead­ing quan­tum labs around the world, with the goal of jump-start­ing domes­tic devel­op­ment when these researchers returned home, accord­ing to a 2019 report by Strid­er Tech­nolo­gies, a Salt Lake City-based strate­gic intel­li­gence start­up.

    Some of those researchers, includ­ing Pan, ben­e­fit­ed from sub­stan­tial for­eign gov­ern­ment fund­ing while study­ing abroad, the report found. “From that regard it has been wild­ly suc­cess­ful,” Strid­er Tech­nolo­gies Chief Exec­u­tive Offi­cer Greg Levesque said of the Chi­nese strat­e­gy in an inter­view with Reuters. “But I don’t know if they are going to win it,” he added. “It seems some U.S. com­pa­nies are mak­ing some real­ly big leaps.”
    ...

    Final­ly, keep in mind that we should­n’t exact­ly expect a grand announce­ment and fan­fare when the var­i­ous antic­i­pat­ed quan­tum break­throughs are accom­plished. At least not any break­throughs in quan­tum code­break­ing. Quite the oppo­site. Who­ev­er comes up with that kind of tech­nol­o­gy is going to have an incen­tive to keep it as qui­et as pos­si­ble for as long as pos­si­ble. While har­vest­ing as much as pos­si­ble:

    ...
    In the mean­time, one chal­lenge for the keep­ers of dig­i­tal secrets is that when­ev­er Q‑day comes, quan­tum code­break­ers are unlike­ly to announce their break­through. Instead, they’re like­ly to keep qui­et, so they can exploit the advan­tage as long as pos­si­ble.

    “We won’t nec­es­sar­i­ly know” when the codes are bro­ken, Kunz told the Pen­ta­gon pan­el. “We will prob­a­bly find out the hard way,” he said. “But what we can expect is that they will be bro­ken.”
    ...

    This is a good time to ask the ques­tion: so was there pos­si­bly a mas­sive secret break­through in quan­tum code­break­ing in the peri­od lead­ing up to the Snow­den affair? Because it’s hard not to notice how that event was cen­tered around the pub­lic mes­sage that “if you encrypt, your data will remain safe”. Not, “if you encrypt, your data will remain safe for the next cou­ple of decades or so, at best.”

    Posted by Pterrafractyl | December 20, 2023, 4:02 pm

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