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Snowden’s Ride, Part I: Eddie the Friendly Spook and the BND

[1]

Rein­hard Gehlen: Nazi head of post­war Ger­man intel­li­gence

Dave Emory’s entire life­time of work is avail­able on a flash dri­ve that can be obtained here. [2] (The flash dri­ve includes the anti-fas­cist books avail­able on this site.)

COMMENT: In our con­tin­u­ing analy­sis of Snow­den’s Ride (U‑2 Inci­dent, II), we take note of the pos­si­bil­i­ty that Eddie the Friend­ly Spook may be in the employ of BND–Germany’s for­eign intel­li­gence agency [3] and the suc­ces­sor to the Rein­hard Gehlen Nazi spy out­fit [4]. It is pos­si­ble that he may have been recruit­ed while post­ed to Europe for CIA. 

That Snow­den may be work­ing for an Under­ground Reich ele­ment of CIA and/or NSA is also to be con­sid­ered.

It is well beyond the scope of this post to syn­op­size the analy­sis and lines of argu­ment set forth in pre­vi­ous dis­cus­sions of Eddie the Friend­ly Spook. Please exam­ine at length and detail our pre­vi­ous entires on this sub­ject: Part I [5]Part II [6]Part III [7]Part IV [8]Part V [9]Part VI [10], Part VII [11].

As Fast Eddie and his far-right [12], Nazi-linked Wik­iLeaks [13] asso­ciates run inter­fer­ence for Ger­many, the Ger­man-dom­i­nat­ed EU and the BND, it is worth tak­ing note of a num­ber of things:

In future posts on this sub­ject, we will exam­ine oth­er con­sid­er­a­tions fig­ur­ing in Germany/BND/EU/Underground Reich motives for attack­ing NSA, GCHQ and Oba­ma.

“Ger­man Court Dis­miss­es Newspaper’s Bid for Full Access to Intel­li­gence Files on Nazi Eich­mann” [AP]; The Wash­ing­ton Post; 6/27/2013. [28]

EXCERPT: Germany’s for­eign intel­li­gence agency can keep secret some of its records on Adolf Eich­mann, the man known as the archi­tect of the Nazi Holo­caust, a court ruled Thurs­day.

The Fed­er­al Admin­is­tra­tive Court ruled that the intel­li­gence agency was with­in its rights to black out pas­sages from the files sought by a jour­nal­ist attempt­ing to shed light on whether West Ger­man author­i­ties knew in the 1950s where Eich­mann had fled after World War II.

Thursday’s rul­ing fol­lowed a deci­sion last year in which the court said the Fed­er­al Intel­li­gence Ser­vice had to release some files it had pre­vi­ous­ly kept secret.

Israeli agents abduct­ed Eich­mann in Buenos Aires in 1960 and brought him to Jerusalem for tri­al. Eich­mann, who helped orga­nize the exter­mi­na­tion of Europe’s Jews as the head of the Gestapo’s Jew­ish affairs office dur­ing the World War II, was found guilty of war crimes, sen­tenced to death and hanged in 1962.

The mass-cir­cu­la­tion Bild dai­ly, whose reporter sued for the files’ full release, has report­ed that West Ger­man intel­li­gence knew as ear­ly as 1952 that he was in Argenti­na.

In 2006, the CIA released doc­u­ments show­ing that it wrote to its West Ger­man coun­ter­part in 1958, say­ing it had infor­ma­tion that Eich­mann “is report­ed to have lived in Argenti­na under the alias ‘Clemens’ since 1952” — both his cor­rect where­abouts and only a slight­ly dif­fer­ent alias, which was actu­al­ly Ricar­do Kle­ment.

The Ger­man intel­li­gence ser­vice said in an emailed reac­tion to the rul­ing that most of the files it holds on Eich­mann are already pub­lic and only a small por­tion still needs to be blacked out. It said that the need to do so stems from laws on “pro­tect­ing state secu­ri­ty inter­ests” and data pro­tec­tion laws.

A lawyer for Bild’s pub­lish­er, Axel Springer, said after Thursday’s rul­ing that it reserved the right to take the case to Germany’s high­est court. Christoph Partsch said in a state­ment that Germany’s inter­ests would be harmed by redact­ing the files, not by releas­ing them.

Mar­tin Bor­mann: Nazi in Exile; Paul Man­ning; Copy­right 1981 [HC]; Lyle Stu­art Inc.; ISBN 0–8184–0309–8; pp. 289–90. [18]

EXCERPT:. . . . Israeli agents who move too close­ly to these cen­ters of pow­er are elim­i­nated. One such ter­mi­na­tion was Fritz Bauer, for­merly attor­ney gen­eral for the State of Hesse in Frank­furt, a sur­vivor of Auschwitz and the man who tipped off the Israeli Mossad about the pres­ence of Adolf Eich­mann in Buenos Aires, who was killed on orders of Gen­eral Mueller. His body was found in his bath­tub and list­ed as “death by heart attack” by the Frank­furt police. The real cause: cyanide spray that caus­es heart stop­page with­out detec­tion; the same modus operan­di that Mueller used to kill the Bor­mann stand-ins that were placed in the Berlin freight yards in April of 1945.

Mueller’s ruth­less­ness even today is what deters Artur Axmann from alter­ing his tes­ti­mony that he saw Bor­mann lying dead on the road­way the night of their escape from the Fuehrerbunker, May 1–2, 1945.To this day, Axmann, the only so-called liv­ing wit­ness to the ‘death’ of Bor­mann in Berlin, knows his life is in jeop­ardy if he revers­es him­self. Gen­eral Mueller is thor­ough and has a long mem­ory, and for a Nazi such as Axmann to go against Mueller’s orig­i­nal direc­tive would make him a trai­tor; ret­ri­bu­tion would sure­ly fol­low. . . .

Ger­many Demands Answers from Britain over GCHQ Sur­veil­lance” by Bon­nie Malkin; The Tele­graph [UK]; 6/26/2013. [16]

EXCERPT: On Tues­day, jus­tice min­is­ter Sabine Leutheuss­er-Schnar­ren­berg­er sent two let­ters to the British jus­tice sec­re­tary, Chris Grayling, and the home sec­re­tary, There­sa May, demand­ing to know the extent to which Ger­man cit­i­zens have been tar­get­ed and warn­ing that democ­ra­cy could not flour­ish when states employ a “veil of secre­cy” to obscure their actions.

Describ­ing the rev­e­la­tions over GCHQ’s sur­veil­lance oper­a­tion as “like a Hol­ly­wood night­mare”, Leutheuss­er-Schnar­ren­berg­er asked for clar­i­fi­ca­tion of the legal basis for Project Tem­po­ra and demand­ed to know whether the pro­gramme has been autho­rised by any judi­cial author­i­ty, accord­ing to the Guardian. She also asked for infor­ma­tion on the spe­cif­ic nature of data that was col­lect­ed and whether “con­crete sus­pi­cions” trig­gered the data col­lec­tion.

“I feel that these issues must be raised in a Euro­pean Union con­text at min­is­ter’s lev­el and should be dis­cussed in the con­text of ongo­ing dis­cus­sions on the EU data pro­tec­tion reg­u­la­tion,” Ms Leutheuss­er-Schnar­ren­berg­er wrote.

The move by the Ger­many gov­ern­ment to high­light its dis­com­fort over the actions of GCHQ is the first time Britain has been asked to pub­licly jus­ti­fy its mass sur­veil­lance oper­a­tion.

The Home Office said it would not com­ment on “pri­vate cor­re­spon­dence”, while the Min­istry of Jus­tice said only that it would respond to the let­ter in due course. William Hague, mean­while, has shrugged off crit­i­cism, say­ing Britain should have noth­ing but pride in its “indis­pens­able” intel­li­gence-shar­ing rela­tion­ship with the US. . . .

“Ger­many to Spend Mil­lions to Expand Inter­net Sur­veil­lance — Report” by Uta Winkhaus; Europe Online Mag­a­zine; 6/16/2013. [24]

EXCERPT: Germany‘s main intel­li­gence agency plans to expand inter­net sur­veil­lance by launch­ing a five-year pro­gramme that will cost 100 mil­lion euros (133 mil­lion dol­lars), Der Spiegel mag­a­zine report­ed Sun­day.

The report about the fed­eral intel­li­gence service‘s (BND) plans comes days after whistle­blower Edward Snow­den revealed details of top-secret US gov­ern­ment sur­veil­lance pro­grammes that gath­ered vast tele­phone records and inter­net data.

With the addi­tional fund­ing, the BND will add 100 new employ­ees to its tech­ni­cal intel­li­gence depart­ment and bol­ster its com­put­ing and serv­er capac­i­ties, the report said.

The gov­ern­ment has already released a first tranche of 5 mil­lion euros, accord­ing to Der Spiegel.

To fight ter­ror­ism and orga­nized crime, the BND is per­mit­ted by law to mon­i­tor 20 per cent of all com­mu­ni­ca­tions between Ger­many and for­eign nations. Until now, it only had the capac­ity to check on 5 per cent of traf­fic — emails, tele­phone calls, Face­book and Skype chats — because of tech­ni­cal issues.

With the new capa­bil­i­ties, the BND wants to ensure that cross-bor­der traf­fic can be mon­i­tored as com­pre­hen­sively as pos­si­ble, just as is done in the Unit­ed States by the Nation­al Secu­rity Agency (NSA), which spe­cial­izes in elec­tronic intel­li­gence. . . .

“The World from Berlin: Elec­tronic Sur­veil­lance Scan­dal Hits Ger­many” by David Gor­don Smith and Kris­ten Allen;  Der Spiegel; 10/10/2011. [25]

EXCERPT: A Ger­man hack­er orga­ni­za­tion claims to have cracked spy­ing soft­ware alleged­ly used by Ger­man author­i­ties. The Tro­jan horse has func­tions which go way beyond those allowed by Ger­man law. The news has sparked a wave of out­rage among politi­cians and media com­men­ta­tors.

It sounds like some­thing out of George Orwell’s nov­el “1984” — a com­puter pro­gram that can remote­ly con­trol someone’s com­puter with­out their knowl­edge, search its com­plete con­tents and use it to con­duct audio-visu­al sur­veil­lance via the micro­phone or web­cam.

But the spy soft­ware that the famous Ger­man hack­er orga­ni­za­tion Chaos Com­puter Club has obtained is not used by crim­i­nals look­ing to steal cred­it-card data or send spam e‑mails. If the CCC is to be believed, the so-called “Tro­jan horse” soft­ware was used by Ger­man author­i­ties. The case has already trig­gered a polit­i­cal shock­wave in the coun­try and could have far-reach­ing con­se­quences.

On Sat­ur­day, the CCC announced that it had been giv­en hard dri­ves con­tain­ing a “state spy­ing soft­ware” which had alleged­ly been used by Ger­man inves­ti­ga­tors to car­ry out sur­veil­lance of Inter­net com­mu­ni­ca­tion. The orga­ni­za­tion had ana­lyzed the soft­ware and found it to be full of defects. They also found that it trans­mit­ted infor­ma­tion via a serv­er locat­ed in the US. As well as its sur­veil­lance func­tions, it could be used to plant files on an individual’s com­puter. It was also not suf­fi­ciently pro­tected, so that third par­ties with the nec­es­sary tech­ni­cal skills could hijack the Tro­jan horse’s func­tions for their own ends. The soft­ware pos­si­bly vio­lated Ger­man law, the orga­ni­za­tion said.

So-called Tro­jan horse soft­ware can be sur­rep­ti­tiously deliv­ered by a harm­less-look­ing e‑mail and installed on a user’s com­puter with­out their knowl­edge, where it can be used to, for exam­ple, scan the con­tents of a hard dri­ve. In 2007, the Ger­man Inte­rior Min­istry announced it had designed a Tro­jan horse that could be used to search the hard dri­ves of ter­ror sus­pects.

Beyond the Lim­its

The hard dri­ves that the CCC ana­lyzed came from at least two dif­fer­ent Ger­man states. It was unclear whether the soft­ware, which is said to be at least three years old, had been used by state-lev­el or nation­al author­i­ties. In a Sun­day state­ment, the Inte­rior Min­istry denied that the soft­ware had been used by the Fed­eral Crim­i­nal Police Office (BKA), which is sim­i­lar to the Amer­i­can FBI. The state­ment did not explic­itly rule out the pos­si­bil­ity that the soft­ware could have been used by state-lev­el police forces.

If the CCC’s claims are true, then the soft­ware has func­tions which were express­ly for­bid­den by Germany’s high­est court, the Fed­eral Con­sti­tu­tional Court, in a land­mark 2008 rul­ing which sig­nif­i­cantly restrict­ed what was allowed in terms of online sur­veil­lance. The court also spec­i­fied that online spy­ing was only per­mis­si­ble if there was con­crete evi­dence of dan­ger to indi­vid­u­als or soci­ety. . . .

“Secret Gov­ern­ment Doc­u­ment Reveals: Ger­man Fed­er­al Police Plans To Use Gam­ma Fin­Fish­er Spy­ware” by Andre Meis­ter; Netzpolitik.org; 1/16/2013. [26]

EXCERPT: The Ger­man Fed­er­al Police office has pur­chased the com­mer­cial Spy­ware toolk­it Fin­Fish­er of Elaman/Gamma Group. This is revealed by a secret doc­u­ment of the Min­istry of the Inte­ri­or, which we are pub­lish­ing exclu­sive­ly. Instead of legit­imiz­ing prod­ucts used by author­i­tar­i­an regimes for the vio­la­tion of human rights, the Ger­man state should restrict the export of such state mal­ware.

In Octo­ber 2011, Ger­man hack­er orga­ni­za­tion Chaos Com­put­er Club (CCC) ana­lyzed a mal­ware used by Ger­man gov­ern­ment author­i­ties. The prod­uct of the Ger­man com­pa­ny Dig­i­Task was not just pro­grammed bad­ly and lack­ing ele­men­tary secu­ri­ty, it was in breach of Ger­man law. In a land­mark case, the Fed­er­al Con­sti­tu­tion­al Court of Ger­many ruled in 2008 that sur­veil­lance soft­ware tar­get­ing telecom­mu­ni­ca­tions must be tech­no­log­i­cal­ly lim­it­ed to a spe­cif­ic task. Instead, the CCC found that the Dig­i­Task soft­ware took over the entire com­put­er and includ­ed the option to remote­ly add fea­tures, there­by clear­ly vio­lat­ing the court rul­ing.

Since then, many Ger­man author­i­ties have stopped using Dig­i­Task spy­ware and start­ed to cre­ate their own state mal­ware. For this task, a “Cen­ter of Com­pe­tence for Infor­ma­tion Tech­nol­o­gy Sur­veil­lance (CC ITÜ)” was estab­lished, sport­ing a three mil­lion Euro bud­get and a team of 30 peo­ple. Today, the Fed­er­al Min­istry of the Inte­ri­or is inform­ing the Fed­er­al Par­lia­ment Bun­destag about the cen­ter’s progress and work. Mem­bers of the Finance Com­mit­tee of the Ger­man Par­lia­ment are receiv­ing a clas­si­fied doc­u­ment, that we are now pub­lish­ing. . . .

“Ger­man Intel­li­gence Scrubs Euroean Records after Wik­iLeaks Expo­sure” by Wik­iLeaks staff; wikileaks.org; 11/16/2008. [27]

EXCERPT: Between Fri­day night and Sun­day morn­ing, a mas­sive dele­tion oper­a­tion took place at the Euro­pean Inter­net address reg­is­ter (RIPE) to scrub ref­er­ences to a cov­er used by Ger­many’s pre­mier spy agency, the Bun­desnachrich­t­en­di­enst, or BND.

The cleanup oper­a­tion comes the night after Wik­ileaks revealed over two dozen covert BND net­works pro­vid­ed by T‑Systems (Deutsche Telekom). The IP address­es were assigned to an unreg­is­tered com­pa­ny at a Munich-based PO box linked to T‑Systems.

T‑Systems purged the RIPE data­base of all address­es exposed by Wik­ileaks, mov­ing the address­es into a sev­er­al giant anony­mous “Class B” address pools.

The move comes just a few hours after T‑Systems Com­put­er Emer­gency Response Team (CERT) con­tact­ed Wik­ileaks to demand removal of an inter­nal T‑Systems memo list­ing the BND cov­er address­es. Wik­ileaks refused and T‑System did not respond to requests for fur­ther detail by the time of writ­ing.

Yet an inves­ti­ga­tion into the address­es over the week­end reveals key infor­ma­tion about the BND’s Inter­net activ­i­ties. . . . .

Web­site ref­er­ences reveal that in 2006 numer­ous hosters of Inter­net web­sites com­plained about out of con­trol “data min­ing” robots from two of the BND-linked IP address­es. One of the hosters ran a pop­u­lar dis­cus­sion forum on counter-ter­ror­ism oper­a­tions.

The integri­ty and trans­paren­cy of the RIPE sys­tem is not assist­ed by the T‑Systems dele­tion. Ger­man cit­i­zens may won­der at the dou­ble stan­dard. At a time when the pop­u­la­tion’s Inter­net address­es are being record­ed by ISPs under laws deri­sive­ly referred to as “Stasi 2.0”, the “real Stasi”—the BND, has had the largest tel­co in Ger­many scrub its address­es from the Euro­pean record with­in 24 hours of their expo­sure.