Dave Emory’s entire life­time of work is avail­able on a flash dri­ve that can be obtained here. (The flash dri­ve includes the anti-fas­cist books avail­able on this site.)

COMMENT: In a pre­vi­ous post deal­ing with, among oth­er things, indi­ca­tions that Prince Bern­hard of the Nether­lands may have delib­er­ate­ly sab­o­taged the Bat­tle of Arn­hem dur­ing World War II, we not­ed Bern­hard’s dual role as head of the Dutch “resis­tance” and spy for the SS and I.G. Far­ben.

Oper­a­tion Mar­ket Garden–the largest air­borne inva­sion of all time–had been designed to short­en the war by strik­ing a deci­sive blow behind Ger­man lines. Had this bat­tle plan been suc­cess­ful, the war would have been short­ened by months and the flight cap­i­tal pro­gram designed by Mar­tin Bor­mann would have been atten­u­at­ed. (The entire­ty of the argu­ment we pre­sent­ed is beyond the scope of this post to present. Please exam­ine our pre­vi­ous dis­cus­sion at length and detail.)

The delib­er­ate sab­o­tag­ing of the bat­tle per­mit­ted the Reich to real­ize its plans for under­ground rebirth and Ger­many’s post­war eco­nom­ic revival.

Bern­hard is best known as the founder of the Bilder­berg group, a pow­er elite con­sor­tium inex­tri­ca­bly linked with the Under­ground Reich. 

Inter­est­ing­ly and very pos­si­bly sig­nif­i­cant­ly, anoth­er key Bilder­berg­er, Lord Peter Car­ring­ton, played a key and very con­tro­ver­sial role in the defeat at Arn­hem. In charge of a corps of Sher­man (M‑4 Amer­i­can-built) tanks, Car­ring­ton refused to advance in com­pa­ny with Amer­i­can para­troop­ers to relieve the besieged British 1st Air­borne Divi­sion.

His fail­ure to advance doomed the 1st Air­borne and the entire Allied bat­tle plan. This fail­ure per­mit­ted the suc­cess­ful real­iza­tion of the Ger­man flight cap­i­tal plan. One won­ders if that “fail­ure” was sim­ply bat­tle­field incom­pe­tence or indica­tive of fas­cist sym­pa­thy and con­se­quent trea­son.

Our jaun­diced view of Car­ring­ton assumes fur­ther sub­stance in light of his role as For­eign Sec­re­tary at the time of the Falk­lands War. Gov­erned by a fas­cist jun­ta, the core of which was the Argen­tine branch of the infa­mous P‑2 Lodge of Licio Gel­li, Argenti­na invad­ed the Fal­ka­lnd Islands and was sub­se­quent­ly defeat­ed by the British expe­di­tionary force.

Car­ring­ton’s stun­ning “fail­ure” to accu­rate­ly antic­i­pate the Argen­tine inva­sion led to his res­ig­na­tion. (See text excerpts below.)

One won­ders if this, too, can be attrib­uted to incom­pe­tence or, rather, to com­plic­i­ty with the forces of inter­na­tion­al fas­cism and the Under­ground Reich.

In addi­tion to his­Car­ring­ton’s strik­ing fail­ure to act in an intel­li­gent and time­ly fash­ion to antic­i­pate the inva­sion, a BBC broad­cast dis­closed key aspects of the British mil­i­tary oper­a­tion short­ly before it was to be under­tak­en. We won­ders if this might have been the work of a Fifth Col­umn with­in the British for­eign office, per­haps act­ing in con­cert with Car­ring­ton?

Peter Car­ing­ton, 6th Baron Car­ring­ton; Wikipedia

EXCERPT: . . . .He also chaired the Bilder­berg con­fer­ences for sev­er­al years in the late 1990s, being suc­ceed­ed in 1999 by Éti­enne Davignon.[15] . . .

. . . .The MC [Mil­i­tary Cross] was award­ed for his part in the cap­ture and hold­ing of a vital bridge in Nijmegen.[7] Although He failed to attempt to reach Arn­hem where Tanks sup­port was need­ed!

The Sec­ond World War: Ambi­tions to Neme­sis by Bradley Light­body; google books; p.233.

EXCERPT: . . . Arn­hem was only 30 miles to the north and the jubi­lant Amer­i­can troops urged an all-out dri­ve by the 30th Corps to relieve the belea­guered British 1st Air­borne Divi­sion. In a con­tro­ver­sial deci­sion, Cap­tain Lord Car­ring­ton (lat­er British For­eign Sec­re­tary) in com­mand of the lead tanks, refused Amer­i­can entreaties to advance. The British forces insist­ed on wait­ing to day­light because the road ahead was nar­row and the Ger­man strength was unknown.

At Arn­hem, the British 1st Air­borne Divi­sion had fought with­out respite from the 17 Sep­tem­ber. By the 21 Sep­tem­ber, Tiger tanks, imper­vi­ous to the para­troop­ers’ light weapons crossed Arn­hem bridge and began sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly to destroy every build­ing held by Frost’s bat­tal­ion. . . . Frost sur­ren­dered the bridge at 9 a.m. . . .

Razor’s Edge: The Unof­fi­cial His­to­ry of the Falk­lands War by Hugo Bicheno; p. 23

EXCERPT: . . . .The great­est sur­prise for Eng­lish-speak­ing read­ers may be to dis­cov­er that ide­o­log­i­cal issues most regard as the defunct relics of a bygone age were — and to a con­sid­er­able degree remain — alive in Argenti­na. Terms like ‘Fas­cist’ and, par­tic­u­lar­ly ‘Lib­er­al’ have lost their his­toric mean­ing in a wel­ter of Anglo-Amer­i­can hyper­bole, but they must be used and under­stood with pre­ci­sion when dis­cussing the deep back­ground. The ene­my Britain fought in 1982 was the same as 1939–1945, on a small­er scale but no less poi­so­nous. Although noth­ing short of con­quest and pro­longed occu­pa­tion is like­ly to mod­i­fy the prin­ci­ples on which a nation orga­nizes itself, one result of the (Falk­lands) war was to cut anoth­er head off the Nazi/Fascist hydra, as worth­while an out­come as any war could have. . . .

“Fight for the Falk­lands: Twen­ty Years” Lat­er; BBC

EXCERPT: . . . . The For­eign Sec­re­tary, Lord Car­ring­ton, and two junior min­is­ters had resigned by the end of the week. They took the blame for Britain’s poor prepa­ra­tions and plans to decom­mis­sion HMS Endurance, the navy’s only Antarc­tic patrol ves­sel. It was a move which may have lead the Jun­ta to believe the UK had lit­tle inter­est in keep­ing the Falk­lands. . . .

“Car­ring­ton and Nott Face Humil­i­a­tion and Fury” by Michael White; The Guardian, 4/3/1982.

EXCERPT: The Gov­ern­ment last night round­ed off a day of spec­tac­u­lar mil­i­tary and diplo­mat­ic humil­i­a­tion with the pub­lic admis­sion by the For­eign Sec­re­tary, Lord Car­ring­ton, and the Defence Sec­re­tary, Mr John Nott, that Argenti­na had indeed cap­tured Port Stan­ley while the British Navy lay too far away to pre­vent it. . . .

. . . .The belat­ed con­fir­ma­tion of the inva­sion which had appar­ent­ly elud­ed min­is­ters — though not the world’s media, Amer­i­can intel­li­gence, or radio hams — came short­ly after it had been agreed that the Prime Min­is­ter her­self would open a three-hour debate on the Falk­land cri­sis in the first Sat­ur­day sit­ting of the Com­mons since the abortive Suez inva­sion of 1956. . . .

“Britain’s Approach on the Falk­lands: Neglect and Hope for the Best”  by Richard Nor­ton-Tay­lor and Owen Bow­cott; The Guardian; 12/27/2012.

. . . . Evi­dence that the Argen­tin­ian jun­ta was adopt­ing an increas­ing­ly bel­liger­ent approach towards the Falk­lands was ignored or dis­missed as mere rhetoric. . . .

“Bat­tle of Goose Green”; Wikipedia

EXCERPT: . . . . Dur­ing the plan­ning of the assault of both Dar­win and Goose Green, the Bat­tal­ion Head­quar­ters were lis­ten­ing in to the BBC World Ser­vice. The news­read­er announced that the 2nd Bat­tal­ion of the Para­chute Reg­i­ment were poised and ready to assault Dar­win and Goose Green, caus­ing great con­fu­sion with the com­mand­ing offi­cers of the bat­tal­ion. Lieu­tenant Colonel Jones became furi­ous with the lev­el of incom­pe­tence and told BBC rep­re­sen­ta­tive Robert Fox he was going to sue the BBC, White­hall and the War Cab­i­net. . . .