FTR#‘s 1373 & 1374: 40 Wall Street, Parts 1 and 2

Intro­duc­tion: “Fol­low the Mon­ey” is an axiom. These pro­grams explore the forces con­trol­ling the cen­ter­piece of his real estate port­fo­lio.

Before delv­ing into analy­sis of 40 Wall Street, we note the alto­geth­er dubi­ous nature of Rep­re­sen­ta­tive Anna Pauli­na Luna, who will head over­lap­ping inquiries into, among oth­er things, the assas­si­na­tions of JFK, MLK and (pos­si­bly) RFK.

Appar­ent­ly fun­da­men­tal mis­rep­re­sen­ta­tions of her back­ground are a mea­sure of Ms. Luna’s intel­lec­tu­al cred­i­bil­i­ty.

It will be inter­est­ing to see if Ms. Luna’s rep­re­sen­ta­tions give intel­lec­tu­al momen­tum to Holo­caust Denial, “Yes” on Aliens, “Yes” on Con­trolled Demo­li­tion of the World Cen­ter, and, per­haps, Don­ald Trump on Mount Rush­more.

Key Points of Dis­cus­sion and Analy­sis Include: Ms. Luna’s Mater­nal Grand­fa­ther’s Third Reich Ser­vice; The use of a finan­cial real estate vehi­cle as a mon­ey laun­der­ing instru­ment for Fer­di­nand Mar­cos’ wealth, the bulk of which came from Gold­en Lily recov­er­ies; The mys­te­ri­ous Ger­man aris­to­crats (includ­ing the Von Bis­mar­ck fam­i­ly) who own the land beneath Don­ald Trump’s 40 Wall Street prop­er­ty; The sale of the 40 Wall Street land to the Mar­cos front three weeks after its pur­chase; The mys­te­ri­ous own­er­ship of the LLC’s con­trol­ling the land beneath 40 Wall Street and (pos­si­bly) Trump him­self; Fer­di­nand Mar­cos, Jr.‘s Gold­en Lily pres­i­den­cy in the Philip­pines; The pro­jec­tion of a fas­cist Gold­en Lily milieu about tak­ing over the U.S. with their own nation­al secu­ri­ty appa­ra­tus; The encour­age­ment of the Mar­cos Gold­en Lily pipeline into the U.S. by the Rea­gan White House and William Casey’s CIA.

FTR#‘s 1371 & 1372: Korea on Our Minds, Parts 4 & 5

Intro­duc­tion: Con­tin­u­ing our analy­sis of the fright­en­ing events occur­ring in Korea, these pro­grams detail the attempts by South Kore­an pres­i­dent Yoon to estab­lish mar­tial law, includ­ing appar­ent false flag attacks on South Kore­an politi­cians, as well as Amer­i­can instal­la­tions and per­son­nel.

Impor­tant dis­cus­sion con­cerns the appar­ent launch­ing of hos­til­i­ties in the Kore­an War by South Korea, there­by lur­ing the North into a well-laid trap. Of para­mount impor­tance in this con­text is the fact that Gen­er­al Kim Suk-won (who fought for Japan dur­ing World War II) was in charge off the bor­der forces for Syn­g­man Rhee’s forces:

. . . . He [John Gun­ther] says that “two impor­tant mem­bers of the occu­pa­tion” went along on the excur­sion to Nikko and that “just before lunch” one of them “was called unex­pect­ed­ly to the tele­phone.” He came back and whis­pered, ‘A big sto­ry has just bro­ken. South Korea has attacked North Korea.’” . . . .
. . . . In the ear­ly morn­ing hours of June 25, 1950, South Korea’s Office of Pub­lic Infor­ma­tion report­ed a South Kore­an mil­i­tary attack on the bor­der city of Hae­ju, which North Korea con­firmed but South Korea lat­er retract­ed.
On June 25, 1950, South Kore­an troops had pro­voked the Kore­an War by cross­ing into the DPRK at sev­er­al points along the 38th par­al­lel and intrud­ing 1 to 2 kilo­me­ters into the DPRK.

Of para­mount impor­tance is John Fos­ter Dulles’ use of the Kore­an War to resus­ci­tate the Axis pow­ers of WWII in order to use them in the Cold War”: . . . . Dulles feared that peace would fatal­ly inter­fere with the plan to rebuild the old Axis pow­ers for a new anti-Sovi­et cru­sade. . . .”

Key Ele­ments of Dis­cus­sion and Analy­sis Include: Dis­cus­sion of Yoon’s pres­i­den­tial body­guard (formed by Japan­ese col­lab­o­ra­tor Park Chung-Hee) helped block his arrest; The “Stop the Steal/MAGA” res­o­nance between the Trump forces in the U.S. and Yoon’s back­ers in Korea; The South Kore­an intel­li­gence service’s back­ing of the Ukrain­ian intel­li­gence agency’s alle­ga­tion that North Kore­an sol­diers were fight­ing in Kursk; Detailed analy­sis from the Moon of Alaba­ma blog cast­ing seri­ous doubt on the verac­i­ty of the Ukrainian/South Korean/U.S. alle­ga­tion about North Kore­an sol­diers fight­ing in Rus­sia; Indi­ca­tions that it was South Korea that attacked the North first, there­by lur­ing the North into a strate­gic trap; Review of Gen­er­al Kim Suk-Won’s role as com­man­der of bor­der forces for Syn­g­man Rhee; Dis­cus­sion of the crit­i­cal strate­gic gains the Kore­an War pro­vid­ed to the West; Dis­cus­sion of the cor­ner­ing of the soy­bean mar­ket by polit­i­cal allies of Chi­ang Kai-shek on the eve of out­break of the war; The revival of the UN Com­mand struc­ture and its augur­ing of the pos­si­bil­i­ty of the resump­tion of hos­til­i­ties; Review of mate­r­i­al from FTR#1142; Colonel L. Fletch­er Prouty’s recount­ing of a deci­sion to launch hos­til­i­ties against Com­mu­nist nations arrived at pur­suant to the Cairo Con­fer­ence of 1943; Prouty’s recount­ing of the Oki­nawa har­bor master’s state­ment that the mil­i­tary equip­ment stock­piled on that island in prepa­ra­tion for the inva­sion of Japan would be divid­ed between Korea and Indochi­na (direct­ly fore­shad­ow­ing the wars that would be fought there in 1950 and 1965; The U.S.-backed assas­si­na­tion of Kore­an patri­ot Kim Koo, who advo­cat­ed for a reuni­fi­ca­tion of Korea; The meet­ing of John Fos­ter Dulles, Kodama Yoshio and Kore­an Yakuza leader Machii Hisayu­ki in Seoul on the eve of the out­break of the war; The use of yakuza and Japan­ese vet­er­ans of WWII as sol­diers fight­ing in South Kore­an uni­forms dur­ing the war; The Japan­ese polit­i­cal view that the Kore­an War was “a gift from the gods.”

FTR#‘s 1368, 1369 & 1370: Korea on Our Minds, Parts 1, 2 & 3

Intro­duc­tion: These pro­grams set forth devel­op­ments in Korea, past and present. FTR#1368 relies heav­i­ly on excerpts from FTR#1141, set­ting forth the his­to­ry of Japan’s cen­turies-long loot­ing of Korea, cul­mi­nat­ing in its bru­tal col­o­niza­tion. Fol­low­ing the end of World War II, the Japan­ese influ­ence in Korea remained dom­i­nant.

That influ­ence derives from the pre­em­i­nent posi­tion in Kore­an soci­ety of col­lab­o­ra­tors with Japan dur­ing its decades-long occu­pa­tion.

Those col­lab­o­ra­tors dom­i­nat­ed the mil­i­tary, police, polit­i­cal cul­ture and cor­po­rate life of South Korea.

A key per­son involved in cement­ing the Japan­ese dom­i­nance over post-World War II Korea is Nobusuke Kishi, whose rise to promi­nence took place dur­ing the Japan­ese occu­pa­tion of Manchuria.

The Japan­ese dom­i­nance of South Korea is a sig­nif­i­cant fac­tor in Pres­i­dent Yoon’s recent attempts at declar­ing mar­tial law, stag­ing provo­ca­tions to jus­ti­fy his actions and (appar­ent­ly) using false-flag attacks on U.S. mil­i­tary per­son­nel and instal­la­tions in an attempt at re-start­ing the Kore­an War.

Key Points of Analy­sis and Dis­cus­sion Include: The tac­tic of tar­ring all oppo­nents of the sit­ting regime as “communists”–a tac­tic that dates to the Japan­ese occu­pa­tion of Korea; even­tu­al Sec­re­tary of State Dean Rusk’s role in draw­ing the 38th Par­al­lel as the divid­ing line between the Kore­as; Rusk’s posi­tion as a key mem­ber of the Chi­na Lob­by; Gen­er­al Kim Suk-won’s role as a key Japan­ese offi­cer dur­ing World War II, as well as his posi­tion as the com­man­der of Syn­g­man Rhee’s bor­der forces; Japan­ese-occu­pied Manchuria as a dom­i­nant pro­duc­er of opi­um and hero­in for the glob­al mar­ket and Chi­ang Kai-shek’s Kuom­intang.

FTR#‘s 1351 & 1352 Conversations with Monte: Conversations #‘s 25 & 26

Intro­duc­tion: These pro­grams con­tin­ue (from FTR#‘s 1349 & 1350)  explo­ration of the his­to­ry of U.S. involve­ment with Asian fas­cism from the pre-World War II peri­od until the present.

Crit­i­cal back­ground infor­ma­tion on U.S. cap­i­tal sup­port for Japan­ese fas­cism and Japan’s cen­turies-long sub­ju­ga­tion of Korea may be found in FTR#‘s 905 and 1141.

FTR#‘s 1349 & 1350 Conversations with Monte: Conversations #‘s 23 & 24

Intro­duc­tion: These pro­grams con­tin­ue (from FTR#‘s 1345 & 1346)  explo­ration of the his­to­ry of U.S. involve­ment with Asian fas­cism from the pre-World War II peri­od until the present.

Crit­i­cal back­ground infor­ma­tion on U.S. cap­i­tal sup­port for Japan­ese fas­cism and Japan’s cen­turies-long sub­ju­ga­tion of Korea may be found in FTR#‘s 905 and 1141.

1. It is inter­est­ing to con­tem­plate the text of a let­ter that Jack Ruby smug­gled out of prison. In the let­ter, Ruby hints that Japan­ese fas­cists par­tic­i­pat­ed in the assas­si­na­tion of Pres­i­dent Kennedy. Cer­tain­ly, ele­ments of what were to become the World Anti-Com­mu­nist League (includ­ing the Asian Peo­ples Anti-Com­mu­nist League) were involved.

The Man Who Knew Too Much; Dick Rus­sell; Car­roll & Graf [HC]; Copy­right 1992 by Dick Rus­sell; ISBN 0–88184-900–6; p. 684.

 . . . Don’t believe the War­ren [Com­mis­sion] Report, that was only put out to make me look inno­cent. . . .I’m going to die a hor­ri­ble death any­way, so what would I have to gain by writ­ing all this. So you must believe me. . . . that [sic] is only one kind of peo­ple that would do such a thing, that would have to be the Naz­i’s [sic], and that is who is in pow­er in this coun­try right now. . . . Japan is also in on the deal, but the old war lords are going to come back. South Amer­i­ca is also full of these Naz­i’s [sic]. . . . if those peo­ple were so deter­mined to frame me then you must be con­vinced that they had an ulte­ri­or motive for doing same. There is only one kind of peo­ple that would go to such extremes, and that would be the Mas­ter Race. . . .

2. While in Oki­nawa dur­ing Japan’s sur­ren­der in World War II, Colonel L. Fletch­er Prouty was wit­ness to the ear­ly com­mit­ment of deci­sive mil­i­tary resources to the wars that were to take place in Korea and Indochina/Vietnam.

JFK: The CIA, Viet­nam, and the Plot to Assas­si­nate John F. Kennedy by Col. [Ret.] L. Fletch­er Prouty; Sky­horse Pub­lish­ing [HC]; Copy­right 2011 by L. Fletch­er Prouty; ISBN 978–1‑51073–876‑8; pp. 17–18.

 . . . . I was on Oki­nawa at that time, and dur­ing some busi­ness in the har­bor area I asked the har­bor­mas­ter if all that new mate­r­i­al was being returned to the States. His response was direct and sur­pris­ing: ‘Hell, no! They ain’t nev­er goin’ to see it again. One-half of this stuff, enough to equip and sup­ply at least a hun­dred and fifty thou­sand men, is going to Korea, and the oth­er half is going to Indochi­na.’ In 1945, none of us had any idea that the first bat­tles of the Cold War were going to be fought by U.S. mil­i­tary units in those two regions begin­ning in 1950 and 1965–yet that is pre­cise­ly what had been planned, and it is pre­cise­ly what hap­pened. Who made that deci­sion back in 1943–45? . . . .

3a. The shoot­ing war in Asia did not end with V‑J Day.

The Night­mare Decade: The Life and Times of Sen­a­tor Joe McCarthy by Fred J. Cook; Copy­right 1971 by Fred J. Cook; Ran­dom House [HC]; ISBN 0–394-46270‑x; p. 219.

. . . . When the war end­ed, Chi­na was in utter chaos. Thou­sands of Japan­ese troops wan­dered around the coun­try­side, ful­ly armed, with no one accept­ing their sur­ren­der. John F. Mel­by [a State Depart­ment offi­cer], in a day-by-day diary he kept at the time, reflect­ed in bewil­der­ment upon this anom­aly. On Decem­ber 27, 1945, he not­ed: “I still don’t under­stand about the Japan­ese. Offi­cial­ly they are being dis­armed, but the fact is they nev­er seem to be. In Shang­hai, fif­teen thou­sand still walk the streets with full equip­ment. In Nanking, the high Japan­ese gen­er­als are bosom bud­dies of the Chi­nese. In the north, tens of thou­sands of Japan­ese sol­diers are used to guard rail­roads and ware­hous­es and to fight the Com­mu­nists. If you ask what this is all about, the answer is either a denial or in more can­did moments a ‘Shh, we don’t talk about that.’ ” In anoth­er entry on Jan­u­ary 30, 1947, a good six­teen months after V‑J Day, Mel­by not­ed that, though it was being kept “very qui­et,” there were “eighty thou­sand hold­out Japan­ese troops in east­ern and north­west­ern Manchuria, who are ful­ly equipped, fight­ing the Com­mu­nists.” . . . .

3b. Of great sig­nif­i­cance is the pres­ence of John Fos­ter Dulles, Kodama Yoshio and Machii Hisayu­ki (head of the Kore­an Yakuza in Japan) in Seoul South Korea on the eve of the out­break of the Kore­an War.

Gold War­riors by Ster­ling and Peg­gy Sea­grave; Ver­so [SC]; Copy­right 2003, 2005 by Ster­ling and Peg­gy Sea­grave; ISBN 1–84467-531–9; p. 115.

 . . . . In Octo­ber of 1949, the Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of Chi­na came into being. Eight months lat­er, in June of 1950, the Kore­an War broke out. Just before the war began, Kodama [Yoshio] accom­pa­nied John Fos­ter Dulles to nego­ti­a­tions in Seoul. The Dulles par­ty also includ­ed Kodama’s pro­tege Machii Hisayu­ki, boss of the Kore­an yakuza in Japan. Efforts to dis­cov­er under Free­dom of Infor­ma­tion what Kodama and Machii did dur­ing the trip with Dulles have run into a stone wall. In the MacArthur Memo­r­i­al archive we dis­cov­ered a per­son­al let­ter from Kodama to Gen­er­al MacArthur offer­ing to pro­vide thou­sands of yakuza and for­mer Japan­ese Army sol­diers to fight along­side Amer­i­can sol­diers in Korea. Accord­ing to sources in Korea and Japan, the offer was accept­ed and these men joined the Allied force on the Penin­su­la, pos­ing as Kore­an sol­diers. . . . 

3c. Japan’s loot­ing of Korea took place over cen­turies. In Gold War­riors, the Sea­graves present the his­to­ry of Japan’s rape of Korea, begin­ning with their account of the gris­ly mur­der of Kore­an Queen Min in 1894. (For more about the Japan­ese con­quest, sub­ju­ga­tion and loot­ing of Korea, see FTR#1141.) ” . . . . the defense­less queen was stabbed and slashed repeat­ed­ly, and car­ried wail­ing out to the palace gar­den where she was thrown onto a pile of fire­wood, drenched with kerosene, and set aflame. An Amer­i­can mil­i­tary advi­sor, Gen­er­al William Dye, was one of sev­er­al for­eign­ers who heard and saw the killers milling around in the palace com­pound with dawn swords while the queen was burned alive. . . .”

A snap­shot of the Japan­ese colo­nial occu­pa­tion of Korea, a focal point of crit­i­cism of the late Park Won-soon:” . . . . [Gen­er­al] Ter­auchi was extra­or­di­nar­i­ly bru­tal, set­ting a prece­dent for Japan­ese behav­ior in all the coun­tries, it would occu­py over com­ing decades. Deter­mined to crush all resis­tance, he told Kore­ans, ‘I will whip you with scor­pi­ons!’ He set up a sadis­tic police force of Kore­an yakuza, order­ing it to use tor­ture as a mat­ter of course, for ‘no Ori­en­tal can be expect­ed to tell the truth except under tor­ture’. These police were close­ly super­vised by Japan’s gestapo, the kem­peitai. . . . ‘Japan’s aim,’ said Kore­an his­to­ri­an Yi Kibeck, ‘was to erad­i­cate con­scious­ness of Kore­an nation­al iden­ti­ty, roots and all, and thus to oblit­er­ate the very exis­tence of the Kore­an peo­ple from the face of the earth.’ . . . the penin­su­la was stripped of every­thing from art­works to root veg­eta­bles. As Korea now belonged to Japan, the trans­fer of cul­tur­al property—looting—was not theft. How can you steal some­thing that already belongs to you? . . .”

4. Top­ics and Points of Dis­cus­sion For Inclu­sion in this series: The Cab­i­net Research Offi­cer next to Ruby at the press con­fer­ence; Gen­er­al Arisue and his myr­i­ad con­nec­tions; Tsu­ji Masanobu and his links to Arisue, the Bataan Death March and also high­light­ing the death of Iris Chang in this dis­cus­sion; Both Syn­g­man Rhee’s and Ngo Dinh Diem’s work for the Japan­ese; The use of the Uighurs by the Japan­ese and their imme­di­ate suc­ces­sors; The divid­ing of Korea at the 38th par­al­lel by Col’s David Dean Rusk and Bon­es­teel; Rusk’s work for Admi­ral Hil­lenkoet­ter at CIA, as well as any oth­er intel­li­gence links you have for him (There was at least anoth­er, but I can’t remem­ber if off the top of my head); Colonel Bonesteel’s lat­er work in Viet­nam as a Gen­er­al and for CIA; Gen­er­al Kim Sook Won and his work as a “Ban­dit Hunter;” Kim Sook Won’s role as com­man­der of Syn­g­man Rhee’s bor­der forces; We will dis­cuss I.F. Stone’s Hid­den His­to­ry of the Kore­an War, not­ing that it appears that South Korea attacked first, bat­ing the North to coun­ter­at­tack; What the Kore­an War did strate­gi­cal­ly for MacArthur & Company—precluding an attack by Mao’s forces on Formosa/Taiwan, as well as solid­i­fy­ing Rhee’s posi­tion in South Korea (which might have been end­ed by a pop­u­lar ref­er­en­dum); JFK’s cut­ting loose of Syn­g­man Rhee and his White Terror—undoubtedly anoth­er major rea­son for his assas­si­na­tion; Willough­by, of course; Jim Wilcott and the Japan­ese fas­cists with whom he worked; Oswald in Japan and E. Howard Hunt’s role in covert oper­a­tions in Japan; Review of JFK’s attempts to extri­cate us from Viet­nam; Eisuke Ono’s role as a Japan­ese Naval Intel­li­gence pay­mas­ter in the U.S. in1933; Fred­er­ick Rutland’s work for Mit­subishi and the oper­a­tional links to Kodama Yoshio and Arisue (Rut­land was the guy Ono was pay­ing); The posi­tion of Ono in the post-WWII bank­ing milieu inex­tri­ca­bly linked with Gold­en Lily—The links to Tiarks, Nor­bert Bog­dan and the role of the Bank of Tokyo as the suc­ces­sor to the Yoko­hama Specie Bank.

FTR#‘s 1345 & 1346 Conversations with Monte: Conversations #‘s 19 and 20

These pro­grams begin an explo­ration of the his­to­ry of U.S. involve­ment with Asian fas­cism from the pre-World War II peri­od until the present.

Crit­i­cal back­ground infor­ma­tion on U.S. cap­i­tal sup­port for Japan­ese fas­cism and Japan’s cen­turies-long sub­ju­ga­tion of Korea may be found in FTR#‘s 905 and 1141.

1. It is inter­est­ing to con­tem­plate the text of a let­ter that Jack Ruby smug­gled out of prison. In the let­ter, Ruby hints that Japan­ese fas­cists par­tic­i­pat­ed in the assas­si­na­tion of Pres­i­dent Kennedy. Cer­tain­ly, ele­ments of what were to become the World Anti-Com­mu­nist League (includ­ing the Asian Peo­ples Anti-Com­mu­nist League) were involved.

 . . . Don’t believe the War­ren [Com­mis­sion] Report, that was only put out to make me look inno­cent. . . .I’m going to die a hor­ri­ble death any­way, so what would I have to gain by writ­ing all this. So you must believe me. . . . that [sic] is only one kind of peo­ple that would do such a thing, that would have to be the Naz­i’s [sic], and that is who is in pow­er in this coun­try right now. . . . Japan is also in on the deal, but the old war lords are going to come back. South Amer­i­ca is also full of these Naz­i’s [sic]. . . . if those peo­ple were so deter­mined to frame me then you must be con­vinced that they had an ulte­ri­or motive for doing same. There is only one kind of peo­ple that would go to such extremes, and that would be the Mas­ter Race. . . .

The Man Who Knew Too Much; Dick Rus­sell; Car­roll & Graf [HC]; Copy­right 1992 by Dick Rus­sell; ISBN 0–88184-900–6; p. 684.

2. While in Oki­nawa dur­ing Japan’s sur­ren­der in World War II, Colonel L. Fletch­er Prouty was wit­ness to the ear­ly com­mit­ment of deci­sive mil­i­tary resources to the wars that were to take place in Korea and Indochina/Vietnam.

 . . . . I was on Oki­nawa at that time, and dur­ing some busi­ness in the har­bor area I asked the har­bor­mas­ter if all that new mate­r­i­al was being returned to the States. His response was direct and sur­pris­ing: ‘Hell, no! They ain’t nev­er goin’ to see it again. One-half of this stuff, enough to equip and sup­ply at least a hun­dred and fifty thou­sand men, is going to Korea, and the oth­er half is going to Indochi­na.’ In 1945, none of us had any idea that the first bat­tles of the Cold War were going to be fought by U.S. mil­i­tary units in those two regions begin­ning in 1950 and 1965–yet that is pre­cise­ly what had been planned, and it is pre­cise­ly what hap­pened. Who made that deci­sion back in 1943–45? . . . .

JFK: The CIA, Viet­nam, and the Plot to Assas­si­nate John F. Kennedy by Col. [Ret.] L. Fletch­er Prouty; Sky­horse Pub­lish­ing [HC]; Copy­right 2011 by L. Fletch­er Prouty; ISBN 978–1‑51073–876‑8; pp. 17–18.

3a. The shoot­ing war in Asia did not end with V‑J Day.

. . . . When the war end­ed, Chi­na was in utter chaos. Thou­sands of Japan­ese troops wan­dered around the coun­try­side, ful­ly armed, with no one accept­ing their sur­ren­der. John F. Mel­by [a State Depart­ment offi­cer], in a day-by-day diary he kept at the time, reflect­ed in bewil­der­ment upon this anom­aly. On Decem­ber 27, 1945, he not­ed: “I still don’t under­stand about the Japan­ese. Offi­cial­ly they are being dis­armed, but the fact is they nev­er seem to be. In Shang­hai, fif­teen thou­sand still walk the streets with full equip­ment. In Nanking, the high Japan­ese gen­er­als are bosom bud­dies of the Chi­nese. In the north, tens of thou­sands of Japan­ese sol­diers are used to guard rail­roads and ware­hous­es and to fight the Com­mu­nists. If you ask what this is all about, the answer is either a denial or in more can­did moments a ‘Shh, we don’t talk about that.’ ” In anoth­er entry on Jan­u­ary 30, 1947, a good six­teen months after V‑J Day, Mel­by not­ed that, though it was being kept “very qui­et,” there were “eighty thou­sand hold­out Japan­ese troops in east­ern and north­west­ern Manchuria, who are ful­ly equipped, fight­ing the Com­mu­nists.” . . . .

The Night­mare Decade: The Life and Times of Sen­a­tor Joe McCarthy by Fred J. Cook; Copy­right 1971 by Fred J. Cook; Ran­dom House [HC]; ISBN 0–394-46270‑x; p. 219.

3b. Of great sig­nif­i­cance is the pres­ence of John Fos­ter Dulles, Kodama Yoshio and Machii Hisayu­ki (head of the Kore­an Yakuza in Japan) in Seoul South Korea on the eve of the out­break of the Kore­an War.

Gold War­riors by Ster­ling and Peg­gy Sea­grave; Ver­so [SC]; Copy­right 2003, 2005 by Ster­ling and Peg­gy Sea­grave; ISBN 1–84467-531–9; p. 115.

 . . . . In Octo­ber of 1949, the Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of Chi­na came into being. Eight months lat­er, in June of 1950, the Kore­an War broke out. Just before the war began, Kodama [Yoshio] accom­pa­nied John Fos­ter Dulles to nego­ti­a­tions in Seoul. The Dulles par­ty also includ­ed Kodama’s pro­tege Machii Hisayu­ki, boss of the Kore­an yakuza in Japan. Efforts to dis­cov­er under Free­dom of Infor­ma­tion what Kodama and Machii did dur­ing the trip with Dulles have run into a stone wall. In the MacArthur Memo­r­i­al archive we dis­cov­ered a per­son­al let­ter from Kodama to Gen­er­al MacArthur offer­ing to pro­vide thou­sands of yakuza and for­mer Japan­ese Army sol­diers to fight along­side Amer­i­can sol­diers in Korea. Accord­ing to sources in Korea and Japan, the offer was accept­ed and these men joined the Allied force on the Penin­su­la, pos­ing as Kore­an sol­diers. . . . 

4. Top­ics and Points of Dis­cus­sion For Inclu­sion in this series: The Cab­i­net Research Offi­cer next to Ruby at the press con­fer­ence; Gen­er­al Arisue and his myr­i­ad con­nec­tions; Tsu­ji Masanobu and his links to Arisue, the Bataan Death March and also high­light­ing the death of Iris Chang in this dis­cus­sion; Both Syn­g­man Rhee’s and Ngo Dinh Diem’s work for the Japan­ese; The use of the Uighurs by the Japan­ese and their imme­di­ate suc­ces­sors; The divid­ing of Korea at the 38th par­al­lel by Col’s David Dean Rusk and Bon­es­teel; Rusk’s work for Admi­ral Hil­lenkoet­ter at CIA, as well as any oth­er intel­li­gence links you have for him (There was at least anoth­er, but I can’t remem­ber if off the top of my head); Colonel Bonesteel’s lat­er work in Viet­nam as a Gen­er­al and for CIA; Gen­er­al Kim Sook Won and his work as a “Ban­dit Hunter;” Kim Sook Won’s role as com­man­der of Syn­g­man Rhee’s bor­der forces; We will dis­cuss I.F. Stone’s Hid­den His­to­ry of the Kore­an War, not­ing that it appears that South Korea attacked first, bat­ing the North to coun­ter­at­tack; What the Kore­an War did strate­gi­cal­ly for MacArthur & Company—precluding an attack by Mao’s forces on Formosa/Taiwan, as well as solid­i­fy­ing Rhee’s posi­tion in South Korea (which might have been end­ed by a pop­u­lar ref­er­en­dum); JFK’s cut­ting loose of Syn­g­man Rhee and his White Terror—undoubtedly anoth­er major rea­son for his assas­si­na­tion; Willough­by, of course; Jim Wilcott and the Japan­ese fas­cists with whom he worked; Oswald in Japan and E. Howard Hunt’s role in covert oper­a­tions in Japan; Review of JFK’s attempts to extri­cate us from Viet­nam; Eisuke Ono’s role as a Japan­ese Naval Intel­li­gence pay­mas­ter in the U.S. in1933; Fred­er­ick Rutland’s work for Mit­subishi and the oper­a­tional links to Kodama Yoshio and Arisue (Rut­land was the guy Ono was pay­ing); The posi­tion of Ono in the post-WWII bank­ing milieu inex­tri­ca­bly linked with Gold­en Lily—The links to Tiarks, Nor­bert Bog­dan and the role of the Bank of Tokyo as the suc­ces­sor to the Yoko­hama Specie Bank.